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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
By VANCE R. DITTMAN, JR.
Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law
This review is intended to cover decisions of the Supreme Court of
Colorado from January 1, 1957, to January 1, 1958. Cases which apply
principles already well established are omitted, it being the purpose of
the reviewer to bring to the attention of the profession only those decisions which are novel in principle or which represent departures from
accepted practices. The same arrangement will be followed as was used
in the review for 1956.'
RULE 4
In Jones v. Colescott,2 the matter of possible waiver of lack of jurisdiction over the person is presented in a novel fashion. Following default
judgments based upon admittedly invalid substituted service of process
a motion was made to set aside the defaults. The denial of the motion
by the trial court was held to be error, the supreme court pointing out
that although the motion by the defendants waived lack of jurisdiction
over them, such appearance on their part would not serve to validate
the void judgment and that the defendants should have been afforded
the opportunity to present their defenses. Thus, although their motion
was equivalent to a general appearance, it did not deprive defendants
of their right to present their defenses going to the merits.
RULE 8 (c)
Davis v. Bonebrake3 deals with the issues presented by an affirmative defense. The order of the trial court permitting the plaintiff to
amend his complaint after presentation of his evidence was assigned as
error. The defendant had interposed an answer setting up the statute
of limitations as a defense and the amendment set up fraudulent concealment of the facts to meet this defense. The supreme court reversed
the decision on other grounds but said, as to this point, that there was
no error since the amendment injected no new issue into the case, no
reply being required by the plaintiff, thus putting the defendants on
notice that any matter in avoidance of the statute would be deemed to
be in issue without a reply. The court pointed out that the amendment
could not be prejudicial to the defendants since the matter set forth in
avoidance was already before the court.
RULE 9 (C)
This rule relates to the pleading of performance or occurrence of
conditions precedent and to the denial thereof, placing on the part),
alleging the performance or occurrence the duty to establish such facts.
In Sullivan v. McCarthy,4 an action to recover guaranteed profits under
a contract of sale of a vending machine, the plaintiff alleged that he
had "complied with the provisions of the contract." 5 This matter was
put in issue by defendant's answer and the issues were resolved in plaintiff's favor. As to another condition the'answer tendered no issue and
the plaintiff offered no evidence to show its performance. The court
said: "The plaintiff, while obligated to establish the performance of those
'Dittman, One Year Review of Civil Procedure,
2 307 P.2d 464 (Colo. 1957).
3313 P.2d 982 (Colo. 1957).
4 314 P.2d 901 (Colo. 1957).
5 Id. at 901.

34 DICTA 69 (1957).
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conditions within the framed issues, is under no obligation to prove
the performance of conditions other than those with reference to which
defendant has specifically alleged failure to perform .... ." Thus, since
the Rule requires a denial to "be made specifically and with particularity," a failure to deny admits the well pleaded allegations of the
complaint.
RULE 14
The device of impleader presents many interesting questions, not
the least of which arose in Arms Roofing Co. v. Petrie.7 Here a holder
in due course of a promissory note brought an action against the maker.
The question concerned the propriety of a third party order secured by
the defendant to bring in as a third party defendant the original payee,
who had endorsed the note to the plaintiff. The third party complaint
alleged duress in the execution of the note and demanded judgment
against such payee for all sums which might be adjudged in favor of
the holder against the maker. The court pointed out that the third party
plaintiff's claim was independent of and apart from the plaintiff's claim
and that the result of the trial between the maker and the payee could
not affect the right of the holder to judgment against the maker or
against the payee-endorser. The court approved a rule stated by a federal
court that "the test to determine when a third party defendant may be
impleaded under Rule 14 is whether he could have been joined originally as a defendant by the plaintiff . . ."s under Rule 20.
RULE 25

In Film Enterprises,Inc. v. Selected Pictures,Inc.,9 one of the defendants (lied pending suit and a timely motion to substitute his executrix
as a defendant was denied. At the trial the action was dismissed and a
new trial was denied. On a motion to dismiss plaintiff's writ of error
the motion was granted and the court pointed out that a substitution of
parties could not be ordered by the supreme court because Rule 25 permits the trial court to order substitution in certain cases within two years
but requires a dismissal as to the deceased party if such substitution is
not made. Hence, at a time three years after the death of a party no
substitution could be made, the Rule being mandatory as to dismissal
and since it acts as a sort of statute of limitations the enlargement of
time thereunder is forbidden under Rule 6 (b).
RULE 60 (b)
It appears that the trial court does not err in refusing to set aside a
default judgment where the defendant alleges merely that he has a
meritorious defense. In Riss v. Air Rental, Inc.'0 the court refused to
disturb the order of the trial court under circumstances where the
defendant was unable to show any excusable neglect on his part, even
though there might have been a meritorious defense alleged.
RULE 69 (a)
In an original proceeding in the Supreme Court for a rule requiring respondents to show cause why the sheriff should not be permitted
to proceed with a sale on execution of certain corporate stock, a debenture bond and a promissory note, the respondents argued that Rule
6 Id. at 902.
7 314 P.2d 903 (Colo. 1957).
s Id.
at 906. relying on United States v.
9 306 P.2d 252 (Colo. 1957).
10 315 P.2d 820 (Colo. 1957).

Jollimore, 2 F.R.D.

148 (D.

Mass. 1941).
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69 (a) authorizes the trial court to prevent sale on execution. This proceeding had been commenced after the district court had denied an
order directing the sheriff to levy upon and sell such items. 1 The court
held that the sale should proceed, pointing out that although the pertinent statute 2 was not cited by counsel, it was, nevertheless, controlling,
and this property not being within the class of assets exempt from execution under the statute, fell within the general provision providing for
the sale of goods and chattels. The court also took occasion to say that
the statute created a substantive right in a judgment creditor to enforce
collection of his judgment against non-exempt property and that a rule
of procedure cannot be so construed as to curtail substantive rights
created by the legislature. This decision clarifies the question as to
the right to reach choses in action on execution, a question heretofore
shrouded in doubt.
RULE

106

In Stull v. District Court3 there was involved an application in
the nature of prohibition, in which it appeared that the district court
had exceeded its jurisdiction by granting an injunction under circumstances where the requirements of Rule 65 were not complied with.
In holding that the proceeding was proper the court, through Mr. Justice
Sutton, said: "There is no plain, speedy or adequate remedy available
to petitioners except that herein sought. . . . [W] e consider it a matter
of 'great public importance' when an inferior court has issued injunctive orders without complying with the provisions of Rule 65."' 1
RULE 112 (f)
Once again the question of the sufficiency of the record on writ of
error has been before the court, this time in the case of Rechnitz v. RechnitZ.'5 Here the transcript was presented to the trial judge at a time
more than three months after the final order of the court. The judge
refused to sign and certify it but plaintiff in error nevertheless filed the
transcript in the Supreme Court. The court granted a motion to strike
the transcript from the files and to dismiss the writ of error, stating that,
without the transcript there was nothing to review, particularly since
the order made by the trial court was discretionary and without a transcript there was no way to show that the court had abused its discretion
or had acted arbitrarily or capriciously.
11 See Jones v. District Court, 312 P.2d 503 (Colo. 1957).

12 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 77-1-2 (1953).
1, 308 P.2d 1006 (Colo. 1957).
14 Id. at 1010.
15 309 P.2d 200 (Colo. 1957).
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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL
AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
By HAROLD E. HURST
Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law
I. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
During the calendar year of 1957 the Supreme Court of the State
of Colorado has considered and decided a number of cases controlled
by the principles of the state and federal constitutions. A number of
other cases were decided in which the reasons given for the decisions
indicated that the court may have had constitutional principles in mind,
but such principles were not specifically identified nor associated with
the Constitution. Only those cases are reported here in which the court
made it plain that its decision was dictated by one of our constitutions.
M,OTOR VEHICLE DEALERS CLOSED ON SUNDAY

Prior to the reconstitution of the court subsequent to the last general election, the court held unconstitutional' the state law 2 prohibiting
the sale by dealers of motor vehicles on Sunday. Under the statute, the
definition of motor vehicles excluded vehicles not designed to operate
on the highways and vehicles used in the production, care or harvesting
of farm.crops. On rehearing, a majority of four justices-three of whom
were newly elected to the tribunal-held the Sunday closing law valid.3
The law was contested as being in violation of the due process clauses
of the state and federal constitutions, the equal protection clause of the
federal Constitution, and the prohibition against special legislation contained in the state constitution.
Discriminatory legislation against a particular class or segment of
people or activities does not violate the constitutional prohibitions if it
can fairly be said that there is a real difference in law or in fact between
those discriminated against and those privileged, which difference bears
a reasonable relationship to the public health, welfare, safety or morals.4
The majority of the court readily recognized a real difference between
motor vehicle dealers and haberdasheries, and between automobile dealers and real estate salesmen. Automobile dealers were different fron
any other kind of dealers because they (lealt in automobiles. The vice
of the decision lies in the fact that it is not only a difference which the
court must find, but a difference which gives rise to some special necessit), for legislating against a utoinobile dealers to promote the public
welfare or safety-a necessity created by such dealers whicl does not exist
by virtue of Sunday operation of otheri kinds of business.
The motor vehicle Sunday closing law involves two discriminations:
(I) It prohibits the selling of motor vehicles except those not intended
to be used on the highways, and those which are to be used for production, tending or harvesting farm crops; and (2) It prohibits selling of
motor vehicles while permitting the selling of sporting goods, household
Mosko v. Dunbar, 8 Colo. Bar Ass'n Adv. Sh. 439 (1956).
2 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann, § 13-20-1 et seq. (Suop. 1955).
Mosko v. Dunbar, 309 P.2d 581 (Colo. 1957).
4 See e.g. Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948); Asbury Hospital v. Cass County,
326 U.S. 207 (1945); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson. 316 U.S. 53., (1942): Tigner
v. Texas. 310 U.S. 141, 130 A.L.R. 1321 (1940); Lindsey v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co..
220 U.S. 61 (1911).
I

2
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short, everything but motor

attempted to gloss over the first exception and lightly
that there was any exception at all. 5 The white-wash
and seems to be ably answered by Mr. Justice Knauss

"Under this exception dealer 'A' having a place of business
directly across the street from dealer 'B' could remain open
for business on the Sabbath day because he had for sale farm
tractors, trucks, machines and tools used in the production,
harvesting and care of farm products. At the same time dealer
'A' might have on his premises a dozen or a hundred motor
vehicles as defined in the limited language of the 1955 Act.
It will not do to say that dealer 'A' cannot sell one of his motor
vehicles on Sunday, for he is permitted to remain open, attract
customers by advertising and otherwise make contacts with the
buying public, while dealer 'B' (directly across the street) who
does not have a farm tractor or dump truck on his lot must
remain closed. We would be naive indeed if we believed that
trucks and motor vehicles, even under the limited definition of
the Act, are not used in the 'harvesting and care of farm prod-

ucts.'

''

One asks: Is there any justification in terms of promoting the
public health, welfare, safety and morals, in permitting the farmer to
buy a pick-up truck on Sunday, while denying the cement contractor
the same opportunity?
The majority didn't even see the problem of equal protection of
the laws and of special legislation involved in drawing the line between
motor vehicles and other commodities such as furniture, second-hand
merchandise or what-have-you. The principal authority relied upon7
by the majority was an opinion of the Supreme Court of New Jersey
written by the highly-respected Chief Justice Vanderbilt. But Chief
Justice Vanderbilt didn't see the problem of equal protection either.
He fell into the same error as did the Colorado majority. He understood that all motor vehicle dealers were to be closed on Sunday; thus,
everyone was being treated alike and consequently there was no denial
of equal protection. But, as indicated above, the question is not simply
"Are all persons in the defined class treated equally?" but also "Is the
class properly defined-are all persons whose activity presents the same
kind or degree of dangers to the public health, welfare, safety and morals
included in the class?"
That such a difference is necessary is clear even from the United
States Supreme Court decision cited by the majority of our state court
in support of its decision.
The principle is stated as follows in a leading case decided by theSupreme Court of the United States:
"The contention as to the various omissions which are
noted in the objections here urged ignores the well-established
principle that the Legislature is not bound, in order to support
5 309 P.2d at 587.
6 Id. at 596 (dissent).
7 Gundaker Central Motors, Inc. v. Gassert, 23 N. J. 71, 127 A.2d 566 (1956).
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the constitutional validity of its regulation, to extend it to
all cases which it might possibly reach. Dealing with practical
exigencies, the Legislature may be guided by experience ...
(Citing cases.) It is free to recognize degrees of harm, and it
may confine its restrictions to those classes of cases where the
need is deemed to be clearest. As has been said, it may 'proceed cautiously, step by step,' and 'if an evil is specially experi-

enced in a particularbranch of business' it is not necessary that
the prohibition 'should be couched in all-embracing terms.' "I
One asks: Is there any difference in the kind or degree of' danger
to the public health, welfare, safety and morals as between the motor
vehicle dealer selling on Sunday on the one hand and the butcher, the
baker, the candle-stick maker on the other? The majority of the court
suggests none. Imagination supplies none.
RIGHT TO NOTICE AND OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD

The right to notice and hearing, as required by due process of law
before liberty or property can be taken, was the issue in two cases decided
during 1957.
The Denver ordinance popularly called the dog leash law,9 prohibiting owners of dogs from permitting such animals to run loose,
came under attack on the ground that property was being taken and
destroyed without notice and hearing. The ordinance provides that
(logs running loose shall be impounded; that notice of the impoundment be given to the owner, if known; that if ownership is not known,
the description of the impounded dog must be posted at the pound;
and that dogs not claimed after three days shall be disposed of. The
court pronounced an unanimous decision'"-one justice not participating-which was soundly reasoned and well-documented, holding that if
notice and hearing were required by due process of law, the notice provided by the ordinance was adequate and reasonable under the circumstances."1
8 Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292, 29 (1924) (emphasis supplied).
Councilman's Bill No. 32, Series 1955, Referred Ordinance No. 80, Series 1955.
10 Thiele v. Denver, 312 P.2d 786 (Colo. 1957).
11 The decision seems to be adequately supported also by such decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States as: Miller v. Schoene. 276 U.S. 272 (1928); North
American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1906); Lawton v. Steele. 152
U. S. 133 (1894).
9
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In the second case raising the question, 2 an original action was
begun in the supreme court, naming the councilmen and city clerk of
Colorado Springs as defendants. The defendants had allegedly illegally
rejected the majority of the signatures on a petition to submit a charter
amendment to the electors in the April election. The complaint requested the court to declare the signatures legal and to require submission of the amendment to the voters. No service of process was made
upon the defendants. On March 13, a brief was filed in support of the
complaint and on March 14, the court considered the matter in conference. To serve the practical necessities of the plaintiffs, a decision from
the court was needed by not later than March 18, because publication
of the proposed charter amendment had to be made beginning on that
day. In such cases, the court follows the practice of issuing an order to
the defendants to show cause, allowing five days for the defendant to
make an appearance. In this case the court was compelled to rule that
to decide the legality of the signatures on the plaintiff's petition by
March 18 would require the giving of notice so deficient in time as to
deprive the defendants of their rights under the due process clause.
"Accepting at face value the statement of counsel that final determination must be made prior to March 18, it is obvious to any fair-minded
person that the issue could not conceivably be determined within that
period of time. '
RIGHT TO CRoss-EXAMINATION

An error which trial courts seem prone to commit 4 is the admission
into evidence of opinions of experts which are formulated in part from
documents or consultations with others. The import of such documents
or conferences is, of course, hearsay. For instance, a doctor who testifies
that it is his opinion that a defendant is sane, because of information in
the written reports of examining experts submitted to and reviewed by
him in forming his opinion, is giving an opinion the whole basis for
which is matter that is not before the court. Such testimony is not
merely an opinion, but necessarily brings in secret evidence which is
not subject to rebuttal or explanation.
In just such a case, our supreme court held that a defendant had
been denied valuable constitutional rights when the trial court refused
to permit cross-examination of the expert to determine if he was testifying to his observations and conclusions or to the facts included in
various documents submitted to him by the prosecution.'The court did not inform us as to the specific constitutional basis
for its conclusion that valuable constitutional rights had been denied.
The Colorado Constitution guarantees to the accused the right to "meet
the witnesses against him face to face."" In addition, numerous decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States make it clear that the
use of secret evidence, not known to the defendant and consequently
not subject to rebuttal, renders a trial unfair and violates the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 7
12 People ex rel. Bunker v, Blunt, 309 P.2d 201 (Colo. 1957).
13 Id at 202.
14 See Bauman v. People, 130 Colo. 248, 274 P.2d 591 (1954); Carter v. People,
119 Colo. 342. 204 P.2d 147 (1949); Graves v. People, 18 Colo. 170, 32 Pac. 63 (1893).
15 Archina v. People, 307 P.2d 1083 (Colo. 1957).
16 Colo. Const. art. II,
§ 16 (1876).
17 Reilly v. Pinkus, 338 U.S. 269 (1949); Ohio Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service
4Comm'n, 301 US. 292 (1937); United States v. Abilene and So. R.R. 265 U.S. 274 (1924);
United States v. Baltimore and Ohio Southwestern R.R., 226 U.S. 14 (1912).
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RIGHT TO REPRESENTATION

BY COUNSEL

Two cases were decided by the court in which convicted men asked
for relief because they had not been represented by counsel. Tile court
sustained both convictions.
In the first case, Freeman v. Tinsley,'9 the opinion recites facts to
indicate that the defendant, Freeman, was young and inexperienced,
was speedily arraigned without counsel and without a reporter being
present, that he had been told by the police that he was charged with
larceny of an automobile and assault upon the owner, and that when
the charge was read by the clerk it turned out to be kidnappingan offense which is divided into several degrees involving technical
distinctions. Freeman had previously sought reversal of his conviction
on writ of error, unsuccessfully,"' and in the instant case was again in
the supreme court on writ of error to review the denial of his petition
for habeas corpus by the District Court of Pueblo County. Freeman
maintained that his conviction on a plea -of guilty in such circumnstances
denied to him rights guaranteed by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
A comparison of the reported circumstances of the Freeman case
with those of the cases decided by the Supreme Court of the United
States20 suggests that Freeman's argument was well-conceived and that
his conviction probably did violate the fourteenth amendment as construed by the nation's highest tribunal. Be that as it may, it appears
that any pronouncement on that issue by our court was dictum because
the court seems to have disposed of the case by applying a number of
earlier state decisions" holding that the only matters which may be
considered on a petition for habeas corpus are (1) whether the petitioner was convicted in a court having jurisdiction of his person and of
the offense charged, and (2) whether the judgment and sentence were
within the statutory limitations.
In the second case raising the question of the right to be represented
by counsel, Vigil v. People, 2 in the court on writ of error to review the
conviction below, it was held that none of Vigil's constitutional rights
1s 308 P.2d 220 (Colo. 1957).
19 Freeman v. People, 128 Colo. 99, 260 P.2d 603 (1953).
20 All cases decided by the Supreme Court of the United States through 1955 involving right to counsel in state criminal proceedings are collected and analyzed in
Hurst, The Right to Representation by Counsel Under the Fourteenth Amendment,
33 DICTA 39 (1956).
21 Rivera v.
People, 128 Colo. 549, 266 P.2d 226 (1953); People ex rel. Metzger v.
District Court, 121 Colo. 141, 215 P.2d 327 (1949); Best v. People. 121 Colo. 100. 212 P.2d
1007 (1949).
22 310 P.2d 552 (Colo. 1957).
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had been denied. The opinion meagerly sets forth the circumstances of
the trial proceeding. Nothing appears in the opinion which would
indicate that Vigil had been unfairly proceeded against or could not
properly protect his rights without counsel. His conviction without
counsel does not seem to run counter to the standards of due process.
FORMER JEOPARDY

The court applied the prohibition against twice putting a person
in jeopardy for the same offense"4 to prevent a second prosecution of the
defendant for embezzlement. The defendant was first charged and convicted on an indictment charging embezzlement "between the dates of
May 24, 1953 and October 19, 1954." While the conviction was under
review by the supreme court, the defendant was again brought to trial
on a charge of embezzling from the same victim "on or about the second
day of January, 1954." The court ordered the second indictment dismissed, holding that when the.matter charged in the second indictment
is admissible as evidence under the first, and could have supported a
conviction, the person24 so charged is placed a second time in jeopardy
for the same offense.
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF GOVERNOR'S DISCRETION

In a proceeding in the nature of quo warranto, 25 the relator asked
the trial court to declare the office of the defendant vacant because the
defendant was not legally qualified to hold such office. The defendant
had been appointed pursuant to statutory authority to appoint as members of the Board of Cosmetology persons who had had at least five years'
practical experience in the majority of practices of cosmetology. The
trial court sustained a motion to dismiss, and the supreme court affirmed,
on the ground that for the judiciary to interfere with the exercise of his
discretion by the chief executive "would be to impair or destroy the
three well-defined and long recognized independent departments of
government.'26 The court apparently had in mind, but did not allude
to, the mandate in the Colorado Constitution that neither of the branches
of the government shall exercise any of the powers of the other2
branches.27 The result is consistent with prior decisions in Colorado. s
OTHER DECISIONS

Our court followed the Supreme Court of the United States in
29
holding invalid racial restrictive convenants relating to real property.
The court also followed a recent federal decision in holding that the
State must, as a matter of equal protection of the laws, provide at public
expense the bill of exceptions from the trial court to support a writ of
error. Where the writ of error is a matter of right, as in Colorado noncapital criminal cases, the writ must be made available without regard
to the financial abilities of the defendant.8 0
23 Colo. Const. art.
II, § 18 (1876).
24 Bustamante v. People, 317 P.2d 885 (Colo. 1957). Accord, Dill v. People, 19 Colo.
409, 36 Pac. 229 (1894).
25 People ex rel. Duncan v. Scott, 134 Colo. 525, 307 P.2d 191 (1957).
26 Id. at 529, 307 P.2d at 193.
27 Colo. Const. art III (1876).
28 E.g., People ex rel. Beardsley v. Harl, 109 Colo. 223, 124 P.2d 233 (1932).
29!Capitol Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Smith, 316 P.2d 252 (Colo. 1957), following
Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 3 A.L.R.2d 441 (1948) and Barrows v. Jackson, 346
U.S. 249 (1953).
30 Petition of Jack Carver Patterson, 317 P.2d 1041 (Colo. 1957), following Griffin v.
Illinois, 351, U.S. 12 (1957).
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In a case in which a fugitive from Alaska resisted extradition from
Colorado, the court held that neither the state nor the federal constitution guarantees a right of asylum to a person who has committed a
crime in a territory and fled to another jurisdiction.3 '
A lease arrangement between the City of Durango and a building
association, under which the association was to issue bonds and build a
recreational hall and the city was obligated to pay a yearly rental for
thirty-one years, pledging its property tax, cigarette tax and parking
meter revenues to pay the rent, with the association bondholders subrogated to the rights of the association to sue the city for interest and
principal on the bonds, was held to be an indebtedness of the city and
subject to the constitutional limits on municipal debt. 2
I1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
During 1957 the supreme court decided eight cases in which it laid
down rules for taking evidence, preparing a record, and making findings in administrative hearings.
NECESSITY

FOR A COMPLETE RECORD

The court made it plain that in Colorado an agency holding a
judicial hearing must make a complete record of the proceeding. 33 Ina
hearing before the county commissioners in a liquor license application
case, no record was made. The hearing was not completed but continued to a later date. When the hearing was resumed, a reporter was
present and recorded the balance of the proceeding. The license application was denied. The district court ordered the issuance of the license
and the supreme court reversed, saying, "(T) lie trial court had no
means of knowing, nor do we, whether the Board acted properly or
arbitrarily and capriciously in denying the application for license." 4
The reversal was accompanied with a remand directing the Board to
afford a new hearing and to keel) a complete record.
PRESUMPTION NOT EVIDENCE
35

In a workmen's compensation case, the claimant's proof included
no evidence indicating an accident arising out of and in the course of
31 Cutting v. Geer 313 P.2d 314. (Colo. 1957).
32 Deti v. Durango, 316 P.2d 579 (Colo. 1957) Colo. Const. art. XT, § 5.
33 County Comm'rs. of Fremont County v.
Salardino, 318 P.2d 596 (Colo. 1957).
34 Id. at 597.
35 Industrial
Comm'n v. London and Lancashire Indemnity Co., 311 P.2d 705
(Colo. 1957).
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employment. The commission indulged, in its findings, a presumption
against suicide and held the respondents to proof "by conclusive evidence" of suicide to overcome the presumption. Benefits were awarded.
The supreme court reversed, ruling that the claimant must prove his
claim. "The fact that there is a presumption against suicide does not
take the place of proof of an accident arising out of and in the course
of employment." 36 It should be noted here that claimant's proof showed
only that deceased died on the employer's premises, on the ground below
an open fourth story window. The court apparently (lid not consider
such evidence to establish a prima facie case of accidental death occuring during the course of and arising out of the employment because the
inference of suicide was equally as strong as the inference of accident.
HEARSAY, INCOMPETENT AND IRRELEVANT EVIDENCE

In another workmen's compensation case,"7 the claimant had twice
before been married before she married the deceased. Her marriage
to the deceased was evidenced by a marriage certificate. The defense
offered and the referee admitted into evidence a letter allegedly signed
by her second spouse which tended to establish that her second marriage
had never been dissolved by divorce, which, if proven, would have negatived the claimant's dependency and resulted in the denial of benefits.
There was no evidence whatever in the record, other than the letter,
to indicate the invalidity of the claimant's marriage to the deceased.
The supreme court, in reversing the district court in vacating the award,
held the letter, as pure hearsay, to be incompetent and without probative effect. Since there was no other evidence concerning the invalidity
of the claimant's marriage to the deceased, the inference of validity-or,
as the court put it, the presumption of validity of the marriage-to the
.deceased was not met with any rebuttal evidence, and the claim of
dependency was established.
The County Commissioners of Larimer County denied an application for a 3.2 beer license by Cloverleaf Kennel Club which was
located at least five miles from the nearest town." At the hearing,
some 150 persons attended, the residence of none of them being established by the record. Introduced into evidence at the hearing were
letters and petitions objecting to the issuance of the license, such letters,
and petitions originating in towns from five to twenty-seven miles away
from the establishment seeking a license. At the hearing, the commissioners called for a show of hands of those present who were for and
against the issuance of the license and, without a count, recorded their
impression that the majority of those present were opposed to the issuance. The license was denied. The supreme court reversed and directed
the issuance of the license, saying:
"To summarize we hold: That the applicant established
a prima facie case entitling it to a liquor license; that the only
evidence to the contrary consisted of petitions and letters which
were incompetent and irrelevant and which the Board should
not have considered. With those letters and petitions stricken
from the record as they should have been, there remains before
36 Id. at 707.
37 Williams v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co. 10 Colo. Bar Ass'n Adv. Sh. 95 (1957).
38 Cloverleaf Kennel Club v. County Comm'rs. of Larimer Co., 10 Colo. Bar Ass'n
Adv. Sh. 90.
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the Board only the prima facie evidence of the Club. On such

evidence the Board should have granted the application."'

9

The decision was based on a holding that a "neighborhood" was
the area adjacent to and homogeneous with the place sought to be
licensed, and that licenses were to be issued so as to fulfill the reasonable needs of the neighborhood." Since the letters and petitions were
from people outside the neighborhood, they were incompetent and
irrelevant-irrelevant is the better term for them under the circumstances. And since there was no evidence to show where the people
attending the hearing resided, the show of hands for and against the
license was incompetent-without probative value as to the issue whether
the needs of the neighborhood were being reasonably served, because
without connecting the people with the neighborhood their testimony,
however given, proved nothing material to the case.
INADEQUATE STATEMENT OF FINDINGS

In two liquor license application cases arising in Denver, where
the ifanager of Safet' is the licensing authority, the court held that
denials of licenses must be reversed because the statement of the man-

ager's findings was either confusing or not supported by evidence in
the record of the proceeding.
In Geer v. Stalhopulos4 1 there were presented in evidence numerous
petitions in favor of the license and little if any evidence that the needs

of the neighborhood were adequately being served by existing licenses.
In his statement of his findings, the Manager stated, as grounds for
denial of the license, that "There are four (licenses) in this neighborhood which adequately serve the reasonable requirements of the residents thereof." 42 Such information did not appear anywhere in the
record. In reversing the denial of the license, the court said:
"Now, the Manager may have informaton, either from his
records or from special knowledge, as to why four licenses are
enough to meet all needs of the area in question. If so, the
record and his findings and order fail to disclose such inforination. Lacking such information, we shall not speculate as
to its existence and as4 3to its quantum or weight in order to
uphold the Manager."
:1 Id. at 92 (emphasis supplied).
41Co!o. Stat. Ann. § 75-2-7 (1953).
41 309 P.2d 606 (Colo. 1957).
4 Id. at 608.
43 Id. at 610.
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The moral here seems to be that the manager, if he is going to
use special knowledge within his possession, must spread such information on the record and give the applicant opportunity to explain
away or rebut any inferences adverse to him which may arise from such
information. Where such information appears for the first time in the
manager's statement of findings, his findings cannot be said to be supported by evidence in the record.
In a similar case, 44 where the written statement of findings was so
confusing that it could not be ascertained exactly what was found and
why, the court said:
"Administrative hearings should be decided according to
the evidence and the law. Findings of fact should be sufficient
in content to apprise the parties and the reviewing court of the
factual basis of the action of the administrative agency, so that
the parties and the reviewing tribunal may determine whether
the decision has support in the evidence and'in the law."4
These cases clearly require an administrative agency not only to
formulate a written statement of what was found, but to include in
such statement the evidentiary facts in the record which support the
conclusion.
OFFICIAL KNOWLEDGE-EVIDENCE

NOT IN

The Stathopulos case discussed in the section
included here, together with two cases in which
mission used its specialized knowledge or expert
not spread on the record and subject to rebuttal,
or deny claims for workmen's compensation.

THE RECORD

above could well be
the Industrial Comopinions of doctors,
in deciding to grant

In one of the cases46 the evidence before the referee established that
the deceased had overexerted himself on the job, was a short time later
struck by a handcar, and died a few hours later of coronary thrombosis.
The referee's finding, showing the benefit of the expertness acquired
in his job, stated that lie was of the opinion that the exertion (omitting
44 Geer v. Presto, 313 P.2d 980 (Colo. 1.957).
4' Id. at 981.
46 Industrial Comm'n v. Harvens, 314 P.2d 698 (Colo. 1957).
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any reference to the blow and other testimony in the record) was not
the proximate cause of death:
"for the reason that overexertion is not ordinarily an element
of coronary occlusion as demonstrated by the fact that more
people that succumb to coronary occlusion do so while asleep
or at rest than while performing any manner of exercise ... '
The referee, therefore, concludes that overexertion was not a
47
factor in the death of (the deceased) ....
No evidence to that effect came in at the hearing and the conclusion
of the referee was, therefore, based entirely upon his own knowledge.
The referee's denial of the claim was reversed. A less than unanimous
court ruled that there was ample evidence to support a finding of causal
relationship between the overexertion and the blow and the death,
without expert medical testimony, and that the referee could not take
"judicial notice" of the extraneous non-evidentiary and prejudicial
information included in his finding and order.
Another workmen's compensation case48 found the referee falling
into the same error. The commission, on its own motion, had reopened
a case to determine if there had been any change of condition in the
disability of a claimant. Evidence was taken, all of which, in the form
of testimony of three surgeons, indicated an increase of five percent in
disability and that additional surgery probably would not effect any
improvement. After the hearing was concluded, the employer's doctor
made an examination and reported to the referee that in his opinion
the increase in disability could be caused by growths not related to the
accident, but that only exploratory surgery would reveal reliable information. The Commission sustained the referee's order dismissing the
reopened case. Obviously, the ex parte statement of the employer's
doctor had been received and considered in deciding to dismiss the case.
Without mentioning the error of receiving and considering evidence
which was not introduced at the hearing and therefore not subject to
rebuttal or explanation, the court reversed the dismissal and directed
that an award be made for an additional five percent disability. It was
deemed error not to render a finding and order in accordance with the
evidence taken at the hearing.
47 Id. at 700.

4S Cain v. Industrial Comm. of Colo., 315 P.2d 823 (Colo. 1957).
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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF CONTRACTS
By PAUL F. GOLDSMITH
Member of the Denver firm
Sears and Goldsmith, and Instructor in the
University of Denver College of Law
REAL ESTATE AND BUSINESS

OPTIONS

During 1957 the Colorado Supreme Court had many additional opportunities to revisit that perennial source of litigation, the real estate
and business opportunity option, with the claims for commissions, forfeitures of earnest money and efforts to secure repayment of the earnest
money.
In this review the cases dealing with this field of litigation will be
considered first. Johns v. Ambrose-Williams' held that a real estate
broker seeking to recover commissions on an alleged open account for
services connected with renting his "principal's" property, must sustain
his action by clear and convincing testimony. In reversing a judgment
for the broker the Colorado Supreme Court stated: "The record is barren
of any evidence that the parties here proceeded on the basis of an
account, nor is there any competent evidence of a contract of employment." 2
Jones v. Hocks, presents a novel situation with a principal seeking
cancellation of a note and trust deed given to the broker as a security for
future services to be performed in selling certain property and securing
a loan on other property. The broker counterclaimed for judgment on
the note and foreclosure of the trust deed. The contemplated acts of the
broker, if performed, would have been the consideration for the note and
trust deed, but the acts were not performed and the trial court correctly
dismissed the counterclaim for failure of consideration.4 The supreme
court would have given Hocks the equitable relief of cancellation of his
note and trust deed, but Hocks failed to assign error to the dismissal of
his complaint by the trial court.
Perino v. Jarvis5 reflects the efforts of a prospective purchaser of a
beer business to recover $1000 left with the vendor's agent until the sale
should be consumated. When the principal could not effect transfer of
the beer license, the agent, now defendant-in-error, kept the deposit.
Perino secured reversal of the adverse judgment. The Colorado Supreme
Court stated, the "depositor is entitled to recover full amount of deposit
if he shows agreement failed of performance because of the breach of the
other party .... " (here the vendor) .6 The defendant did not allege nor
prove either the willingness of the principal to perform, nor the existence of any damages. The court again set out the guide posts of the
1 317 P.2d 897 (Colo. 1957).
2 Id. at 898.

3 315 P.2d 987 (Colo. 1957).
4 Restatement, Contracts § 75, comment a (1933).
5 312 P.2d 108 (Colo. 1957).
6 Ibid.
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essential elements of a contract for retention of a sum paid as liquidated
damages.'
In another case, one Cumming sued to recover a deposit paid under

a written contract to purchase certain personalty from one Payne-'
Cumming claimed that the contract was mutually rescinded by a subsequent parol agreement. The jury found this to be the fact. Basing
its decision squarely on Niernberg v. Feld,9 the Colorado Supreme Court
held that a written contract can be voided by evidence of a rescission
resting in parol. A noted authority on contracts has approved this view
in these words: "Even if a contract is in writing, whether it is required
by the statute to be in writing or is not so required, it10can be rescinded
by parol agreement as long as itis wholly executory."
In Wyatt v. Buchanan' the plaintiff sued to recover a $500 deposit
on the purchase of a dress shop. Conditions for forfeiture of the deposit
and its retention by the agent as liquidated damages were set out in the
writing signed by the plaintiff. The court approved the forfeiture, and
by inference we can assume that the essentials for a contract for liquidated
damages lacking in Perino v. Jarvis are present here.
at 109. The elements are: ".... that the damages to be anticipated are un7 Id.
certain in amount or difficult to be proved . . . that the parties intended to liquidate
them in advance. . . and that the amount stated is a reasonable one, that is, not
25 C.J.S. § 102 (1941).
greatly disproportionated to the presumable loss or injury.
See alsc Restatement, Contracts §§ 339, 340 (1933).
8 Payne v. Cumming, 315 P.2d 818 (Colo. 1957).
9 131 Colo. 508, 283 P.2d 640 (1955)
10 Corbin, Contracts § 302 (1952).
11 312 P.2d 510 (Colo. 1957).
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During the past year the Supreme Court of Colorado dealt with the
problems of claims for specific performance of real estate conveyances in
three cases. Hill v. Chambers12 was an action to specifically enforce the
defendants' oral promise to convey one acre of land to the plaintiffs, if
the plaintiffs would build a house, which house the plaintiffs built. In
granting specific performance the trial court held that the building of
the house was part performance of the contract and thereby the statutory
requirement 1 of a writing to support a promise to convey an interest in
land was eliminated. It is to be noted that the Colorado Supreme Court
again stated that where specific performance is sought, "the contract
must be clear, and established beyond question, and even then the granting or refusing of the requested decree rests largely in the discretion of
the court."' 4
Dunton v. Breymaier 5 was an action to secure conveyance of land,
or in the alternative to secure refund of the amount paid by the optionee
to the defendants under an agreement of June 12, 1947. The optionee
was to subdivide a larger tract of land, pay $6,000 on or before October
1, 1948, and pay a similar sum during a subsequent year of a five year
period. Upon performance of these conditions, the defendants were to
convey land at $600 per acre. Only $1,500 additional was paid, and the
optionee did not subdivide the acreage. The optionee assigned its rights
to the plaintiff corporation. In affirming a judlgment dismissing the
complaint the court relied heavily on a letter delivered the day after
the contract was made. The letter contained the optionee's quit claim
deed to the acreage which was to be delivered to the defendants and
recorded if the optionee failed to fully perform the contract. From the
letter and the terms of the contract it was clear that the assignee did
not agree to purchase any property nor to bind itself to make any payments. The court re-emphasized the characteristics of an option, saying:
"It may be laid down as an established rule of law that unless the contract contains language which may reasonably be construed as an agreement on the part of the vendee to purchase the property, or to assume
obligations thereunder, it will be an option contract and not an agreement of sale and purchase ....
16 The right to claim a conveyance never
arose and is defeated by the non-performance of the optionee. The facts
only disclose an option which was terminated by failure to exercise it.
The final case involving both earnest money and specific performance is Kalish v. Brice. 7 This case is the most interesting of all, and so
has been reserved for comment here. It has twice been before the Colorado Supreme Court. First, it tested the right of the plaintiff to amend
his complaint from an action for return of the deposit to an action for
specific performance of an alleged duty to convey real estate. In the first
review," the court permitted the amendment solely on the basis of Rule
15 (a)19 for the reason that the defendants had not filed an appearance
nor a responsive pleading prior to the tendering of the amended complaint. The instant case followed a judgment of non-suit by the trial
court at the close of the plaintiff's evidence on the amended complaint,
a prima facie case for specific performance not having been shown. In
12114 P.2d 707 (Colo. 1957).

1:: Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 59-1-8
14 314 P.2d at 709.
1.5 316 P.2d 1.048 (Colo. 1957).
16 Id. at 1052.
17 315 P.2d 829 (Colo. 1957).

(1953).

I Kalish v. Brice 130 Colo. 220, 274 P.2d 600 (1957).

19 Ibid.
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granting the non-suit, the trial court granted Kalish the right to amend
his complaint and pray for return of the deposit (the relief he originally
sought) . The court stated that upon such amendment judgment for
the return of the deposit would be entered. Kalish sought to reverse
the judgment of non-suit. The Colorado Supreme Court, in affirming
the trial court, made it letter clear that this is not a case involving an

election of remedies. Kalish demanded return of his deposit and then
waited about two years before filing the original action for its return.

Ten months later he sought to amend to claim specific performance,
because he had discovered that the property had been improved and
greatly increased in value. Such conduct was consistent only with a
repudiation of the receipt and option. If Kalish ever did have an election he made it when he originally acted to regain his deposit. "The
set of facts arising from the conduct of Kalish prior to the filing of the
amendled complaint permitted resort to only one remedy-the return of
the deposit."2 Consequently, as a matter of law, the trial court had to
grant the non-suit. Kalish had originally asserted a right to return of
the deposit on the ground of a title defect, which Brice always denied.
Since Brice did not object to the trial court's order concerning amendment to return to the original complaint, it would appear that Kalish
gets a refund of his deposit and the defendant is deprived of an opportunity to present evidence to establish marketability of the title. However, no cross-error was assigned to this order permitting amendment
and entry of judgment for return of the deposit. It is this reviewer's
thought that we may have occasion to re-visit this case should such amendment be attempted and should judgment for return of the deposit then
be entered.2"
MISCELLANEOUS

CONTRAcT CASES

In addition the Colorado Supreme Court considered cases involving
the measure of damages for breach of contract, pleading and proof of
conditions precedent, the right of a consignee of personalty to reject
goods damaged in transit, the meaning of the word "or"; the stability of
the State of Colorado for breach of an authorized contract, the effect
of acceptance of personalty which a buyer later claims fails to conform
to an implied warranty of fitness for its intended use, a grubstake contract-ala scintillater-, the dead man's statute and several promisees,
legality of a condition limiting the right of a holder of a license to apply
for removal to another location of a hotel and restaurant liquor license,
and the right of a third party creditor beneficiary to sue. Cases involving these subjects are considered below.
In Brenaman v. Willis2 the problems of mitigation of damages and

non-recovery of speculative (non-contemplated) damages for breach of
contract were considered. The Colorado Supreme Court quoted with
approval the following language: "Where the defendant has breached
a contract it is the duty of the injured party to take such reasonable steps
as are within his power to reduce the damages which he has sustained,
or to lessen or avoid23 them as a reasonably prudent man would take in
like circumstances.

20 315 P.2d at 831.
21 Cf. Restatement, Contracts § 382 (1933). The reader may be interested in knowing that the area in question is now part of what is known as "Holly Hills," south
and east of Denver.
22 314 P.2d 691 (Colo. 1957).
23 Id. at 693 (emphasis supplied).
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While cases dealing with mitigation of damages frequently use the
word "duty," it is believed that nothing is gained by such wording. If

there were in fact a duty, then the law should penalize the injured party's
inaction. This it does not do, "it merely does nothing to compensate him
24
for the harm that a reasonable man in his place would have avoided."
The Colorado Supreme Court had occasion to consider the effect of
a specific denial of performance of certain conditions precedent to plaintiff's right to recover on a guarantee, in a case where the plaintiff's complaint generally alleged performance of all conditions precedent. This
was the case of Sullivan v. McCarthy.2- Under Rule 9 (c),25 the case
holds that the plaintiff had only to prove occurrence of those conditions
denied. He did not have to prove occurrence of the other conditions
stated in the guarantee.
The case of Denver Truck Exchange v. Perryman27 could properly
be commented upon under workmen's compensation. It is of interest
to us here for three reasons:
(1) the Colorado Supreme Court here
defined "contract," and distinguished an "arrangement," (2) the opinion
contains an excellent discussion of offer and acceptance in unilateral
contracts, and (3) it reaffirms the rule that generally the place of making the contract is the place where the last act in creating the contract
is done-and in the case of unilateral contracts it is the place where the
requested act is performed or performance is begun.
Denver-Chicago Trucking Co. v. Republic Drug Co." is a case involving the right of a consignee to refuse to accept a shipment from a
carrier where twenty-five percent of the merchandise shipped is damaged in transit. The case also interprets the word "or" as used in a bill
of lading providing: "As a condition precedent to recovery, claims must
be filed in writing with the receiving or delivering carrier, or carrier
issuing this bill of lading, or carrier on whose line the loss, damage,
injury or delay occurred ....,29 Denver-Chicago, a third party defendant
and counterclaimant contended that the word "and" should be substituted for the word "or." This the Supreme Court refused to do for the
reason that such interpretation would have been unreasonable, stating
"the disjunctive word, 'or,' which, when used in this sense is defined by
Webster as: 'A co-ordinating particle that marks an alternative ...It
often connects a series of words or prepositions, presenting a choice of
either'."30 As to the second problem, that of rejection of the consigned
goods, the court held that a consignee cannot abandon an entire shipment because some twenty-five percent of it is damaged in transit where
the goods retain a substantial value. The consignee is entitled to recover
damages for the goods injured.
In Ace Flying Service v. Colorado Dep't of Agriculture,3 ' already
reviewed in DICTA, 2 the Colorado Supreme Court holds that the State's
authorized contracts are enforceable to the same extent as those of an
individual.
24

Restatement, Contracts § 336, comment d (1933).

314 P.2d 901 (Colo. 1957).
Colo. R_ Civ, P. 9(c).
307 P.2d 805 (Colo. 1957).
306 P.2d 1076 (Colo. 1957).
Id. at 1078.
Ibid.
314 P.2d 278 (Colo. 1957).
32 34 DICTA 422 (1957).
25
26
27
25
29
30
31
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Vanadium Corp. v. l4esco Stores"3 was an action to recover the
price of turkeys. The defendant filed a third party complaint. The
third party defendant, Vanadium, having accepted the turkeys, was held
to have the burden of proving that the turkeys were unfit for human
consumption at the time of acceptance, four and one-half days before
opening the bags containing them. To find acceptance of the turkeys
by Vanadium the definition of acceptance under our sales act was applied: "the buyer is deemed to have accepted the goods when he intimates
to the seller that he has accepted them, or when the goods have been
delivered to him, and he does any act in relation to them which is inconsistent with the ownership of the seller, or when, after the lapse of a
reasonable time, he retains the goods without intimating to the seller
that he has rejected them.'' 34 "There is no presumption that the defects
discovered after delivery existed at the time of sale.''""
Smaller v. Leach" may well prove to be the most important case
decided in the contract field in 1957. The case involves an oral grubstake
contract (held not to be within the statute of frauds) concerning the
radiometric prospecting for uranium by week-end prospectors. The
grubstake is not beans and a donkey, but the loan of a scintillator. This
case could have wide application to our region. The Colorado Supreme
Court has gone to great lengths to define the right of the grubstakor
33308 P.2d 1011 (Colo. 1957).
a41d. at 1014, citing Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann.
35 Id. at 1014.
.6316 P.2d 1030 (Colo. 1957).
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and grubstakee concerning mineral discovery by means of, pursuant to,
and (luring the continuance of the grubstake contract. The decision
cannot be treated here at length but merits greater attention. The basic
law of grubstake contracts is here molded to accommodate a new mining
frontier.
Of interest in considering the leasing of a location where a tavern
is to be operated is the case of Jones v. Parsons?3 This case could have

been considered along with the first cases reviewed, but since it turns
on the question of a claimed illegality of a condition in a lease, its discussion was delayed. In this decision, the trial court's judgment ordering
refund of a $1,000 deposit paid on a receipt and option agreement concerning purchase of a tavern was reversed. The Colorado Supreme Court
held that it is not a violation of the Colorado Liquor Code nor of public
policy for the seller and buyer of a tavern to agree that in the event of
termination of the business, or the lease, for any reason, the lesseeoptionee would not attempt to move the three-way liquor license from
the leased location, but would surrender it to the licensing authority in
favor of the optionor-lessee.
Miller v. Hepner38 involved a novel attempt to avoid a statutory
exception to the dead man's statute. 39 Plaintiff, Miller, sued on two
counts: (1) for accounting, and (2) for money due under an agreement with Hepner. At the pre-trial conference he was erroneously required to elect between the counts, and elected to rely on count (2).
In its simplest terms Hepner agreed to pay a certain sum to plaintiff
and to Hepner's wife, monthly. Hepner died during the pendency of
the suit and his widow, as executrix, was substituted as defendant on
this second claim. When Miller offered his testimony, concerning conversation with the decedent in the presence of Mrs. Hepner, it was excluded. The theory of the exclusion was: (a) that Miller was suing to
enforce a right as a joint promisee, and (b) that the widow of Hepner,
also a promisee under Hepner's promise, was co-promisee, or had interests under the promise parallel with Miller's interests (c) therefore,
pecuniarily, the interests of both Miller and Mrs. Hepner were antagonistic to the estate of Hepner, and (d) under Norris v. BradshalV4° the
exception of the dead man's statute4" did not apply. As a practical matter,
the widow stood to receive everything from the estate of Hepner (after
a certain small bequest) and since her interest in payment under Hepner's promise was found to be several and independent, and not joint,
she did not have to rely on the plaintiff's action to recover from the
estate. In fact, it was to her interest to eliminate Miller's claim, for that
would increase her interest in the estate. Asserting her claim under
37 10 Colo. lEar Ass'n Adv. Sh. 88 (1957).
3s 314 P.2d 604 (Colo. 1957).
39 Colo. fiev. Stat. Ann. § 153-1-2(6) (1953).
40 92 Colo. 35, 18 P.2d 467 (1935).
41 See note 39 supra.
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Hepner's promise would only be paying herself out of her own pocket.
The Supreme Court of Colorado was able to pierce the executrix's ingenious argument, and reversed the judgment of the trial court which

had dismissed's Miller's complaint, by clear analysis of the so-called "joint
promise" resolving this claim by classifying the interests of plaintiff and
Mrs. Hepner as "several" and concluded: "Mrs. Hepner's pecuniary
loyalties were entirely on the side of the estate. She was wholly averse
to the claim of the plaintiff. She fulfilled the letter and the spirit of" 2
the statute.
The report of the case leaves unsettled, in this reviewer's thought,
the questions of what was the consideration for Hepner's promise and
whether such a promise as his was in aid of a legal purpose. The agreement indicated that Hepner was receiving excess compensation from
the corporation and then was splitting the excess compensation with
his wife and Miller.
The last case decided in the contracts field is Sanders v. Black. 3
For a sufficient consideration Lillian Black promised Arthur Black that
she would discharge an encumbrance on Myrtle Black's property. It
appears that Myrtle was in the position of a creditor of both Lillian
and Arthur. When Lillian sold other property to Sanders, part of the
consideration was Sanders' promise to pay off the encumbrance on
Myrtle's property. Sanders defaulted and Myrtle paid off the encumbrance. In affirming the judgment of the trial court in favor of Myrtle
and against Lillian and Sanders, the Colorado Supreme Court again
agreed that a third party beneficiary may enforce a promise made for his
benefit even though the beneficiary is neither a party to the contract nor
to the consideration therefore. Sanders assumed the obligation of Lillian.
The obligation of Lillian still remained. It was not "transferred." Obligations may be delegated, and assumed. If the obligation were actually
"transferred" then a novation would result, with Sanders being substituted as the debtor, instead of being an additional debtor to whom
Myrtle might look for performance. The use of the word "transferred"
in the option is a misnomer at least as to legal effect of the agreement
between Lillian and Sanders.
Viewing the above cases in retrospect and on an overall basis, they
reflect credit on the Colorado Supreme Court.
42 314 P.2d at 606. For a further discussion on "several"

interests of co-prornisees,

see Restatement, Contracts §§ Ill and 128 (1933).
43 318 P.2d 1100 (Colo.

1957).
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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
By AUSTIN W. ScoT, JR.
Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law
In the criminal law field, the reported cases decided by the Colorado Supreme Court during 1957 deal, as usual, mostly with procedural
problems, and only to a lesser extent with problems of substantive
criminal law.
I. SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW
POWER TO CREATE CRIMES

Under its so-called "police power" a state has broad power to regulate its internal affairs for the protection or promotion of the public
welfare-particularly the health, safety or morals of its people; and it
is common for state legislation so regulating to provide criminal penalties for violations. No doubt much that is done in the name of promoting the public welfare is the result of the effective operation of
pressure groups on the legislature, rather than the result of a genuine
determinaton by the legislature of the requirements of the public
welfare. Courts have seldom substituted their own notions of what the
public welfare requires for those of the legislature; and similarly have
seldom held a statute invalid because they know or believe the statute
is the product of pressure from an effective lobbying group. The Colorado Supreme Court in Mosko v. Dunbar' considered the constitutionality of a 1955 Colorado criminal statute making it a misdemeanor for
anyone to sell new or used cars (excepting farm tractors and trucks) on
Sunday. Very likely the statute was passed at the instigation of Denver
car dealers who wished to eliminate the Sunday competition of suburban
dealers, who were accustomed to doing a brisk Sunday business while
their Denver colleagues were observing the Sabbath in a more solemn,
less commercial fashion. The supreme court upheld the statute in a
four to three decision, the majority stating that the legislature has the
exclusive power to determine what the public welfare requires, and that
the courts should not try to substitute their own views on the matter.
Chief Justice Moore dissented on the ground that the statute did not
in fact promote the public health, safety, morals or welfare (the legislature did not even intend that it should, since the statute was enacted
to serve the private purposes of a small group) ; and a statute which
takes away the right to work when one pleases, if not done to promote
the public welfare, constitutes a deprivation of liberty or property without due process of law.2 The majority view seems more in accord with
modern judicial attitudes toward the police power.
ACCESSORY AFTER THE FACT

A Colorado criminal statute punishing an accessory after the fact
defines him as one "who, after full knowledge that a crime has been
1 309 P.2d 581 (Colo. 1957).
2 The other two dissenters, Justices Knauss and Sutton, considered the statute
unconstitutional, not on the broad due process ground stated by Judge Moore, but on
the narrower ground that by singling out dealers in cars (as distinguished from other
products, including even farm tractors and trucks) the statute unreasonably discriminated against car dealers, in violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth

amendment of the United States Constitution, and constituted a "special law" forbidden by the

Colorado Constitution.
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committed, conceals it from the magistrate, or harbors and protects the
person charged with or found guilty of the crime. " 3 Does one "conceal"
a crime which he knows has been committed, when he merely remains
silent? The supreme court said no, in Lowe v. People.4 Something of
an affirmative nature is required in order to "conceal." The court held
that there was no evidence that Lowe concealed the crime or harbored
the criminal.
1I. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
VENUE

A criminal defendant in Colorado has a constitutional right to
trial by a jury of the county wherein the crime is alleged to have been
committed.' This constitutional right, like most other such rights, is
generally considered to be for the sole benefit of the defendant, so that
he may waive it if he sees fit, as where he expressly consents to trial in
another county.6 In Vigil v. People7 the supreme court went further,
and stated that, since the defendant pleaded guilty at arraignment, the
constitutional right to a local trial was inapplicable, because there can
be no "trial" after a guilty plea. Is it true that one who wishes to plead
guilty has no right to object to doing so in a county other than the
county of the crime? The reasons for the constitutional right to a
local trial are usually expressed to be: (1) the greater ease and inexpensiveness for the defendant to produce his witnesses, since the witnesses
are most apt to be clustered around the place of the crime; and (2) the
advantage to the defendant when tried among his neighbors, friends
and acquaintances, who know his good reputation (if any) , compared
to trial among strangers who know nothing about him except the one
bad fact that he is accused of crime. It is true these reasons are more
applicable t6 a trial on a guilty plea; but the defendant does have a
right to produce in evidence mitigating circumstances after a guilty
plea, and perhaps there is a somewhat similar advantage, in a proceeding to determine the sentence, in having it held before a local, rather
than a strange and distant, judge, as there is in a trial before a local,
is distinguished from a strange and distant, jury. The question whether
3 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40-1-13 (1953).

4 309 P.2d 601 (Colo. 1957).
5 Colo. Const. art. II
§ 16 (1876). Though the constitution speaks of "county or
district," this probably requires trial in the county of the crime.
6 Vigil v. People, 310 P.2d 552 (Colo. 1957) (another county in the same district),
following Davis v. People, 83 Colo. 295, 264 Pac. 658 (1928) (implied waiver by proceeding without objection to trial in another county of another district).
7 310 P.2d 522 (Colo. 1957).
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the proceedings on a plea of guilty constitute a "trial" within the meaning of the constitutional right to a local trial seems to be a novel one;
perhaps it deserves more attention than the court gave it in the Vigil
case, where it was not actually necessary to the decision. The same constitutional provision, for instance, gives the defendant a right to a
"speedy trial" and to a "public trial," as well as to a trial in the county.
Must not the proceedings be public even if the defendant pleads guilty;
and is not the defendant entitled to a speedy arraignment even though
he may at arraignment plead guilty?
In another Colorado case, there was some question as to whether
a rape was committed in X County, as the information alleged, or in
Y County. The police officer who visited the scene of the crime testified that he thought, but was not sure, it was in X County. In the
absence of any proof by the defendant to the contrary, the court held a
directed verdict for the defendant was properly denied. 8
RIGHT TO COUNSEL

Two Colorado cases raise again the question of whether the trial
court, in a non-capital felony case, must, under the Colorado constitutional or statutory law or under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, inform an indigent defendant of his right to counsel
before accepting from him a guilty plea.' In Freeman v. Tinsley" the
defendant in a kidnapping case was twenty-one years old, had only a
sixth grade education, had no friends in Colorado, and, though he had
had previous trouble with the law in another state, had never had
counsel to defend him. At his arraignment, the judge apparently did
not tell him of his right to counsel and made no effor.t to appoint
counsel. (The defendant later claimed he did not know of his right
to counsel.) After the judge explained the consequences of pleading
guilty and not guilty, the defendant pleaded guilty. In Vigil vs. People"
the defendant, charged with rape, was twenty-six; no other facts of his
background appear. He too was not informed at arraignment of his right
to counsel. He expressly waived his right to be tried in the county where
the crime was committed and then pleaded guilty, receiving a twelve to
twenty year sentence. In each case the supreme court held that there was
8 Abeyta v. People, 134 Colo. 441, 305 P.2d 1063 (1957).
9 Freeman v. Tinsley, 308 P.2d 220 (Colo. 1957); Vigil v. People, 310 P.2d 552
(Colo. 1957), expressly following Kelley v. People, 120 Colo. 1, 206 P.2d 337 (1949).
10 308 P.2d 220 (Colo. 1957).
11 310 P.2d 522 (Colo. 1957).
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defendant's rights, under either Colorado law or fedno violation of the
12 eral due process
It is, of course, true that the supreme court has the final say as to
the meaning of the Colorado constitutiona 1 3a and statutory 4 provisions
concerning a criminal defendant's right to counsel. It is not entirely
clear whether the court is holding that Colorado law does not require
the appointment of counsel for an indigent defendant in a non-capital
felony case; or that he does not have such a right if he pleads guilty
(having it only if he pleads not guilty) ; or that though he has such a
right whether he pleads guilty or not guilty, he has no right to be informed of the right, whether he knows of the right or not. It would
seem that fair criminal procedure requires that counsel should be appointed for an indigent defendant in at least a serious non-capital felony
case, even in the situation where he pleads guilty, as he should have
proper advice as to how he should plead. And if counsel should be
appointed, fairness requires that the judge tell him of this right and
make an offer to appoint counsel, at least if he does not know of his
right to appointed counsel. Doubtless there are many convicts now in
the Colorado penitentiary who were not told at arraignment of their
right to appointed counsel. The supreme court naturally does not wish
to open'the door to a flood of petitions from such people. But could
the Colorado Supreme Court not announce a new rule, applicable to
future trials only, which would incorporate some of these matters which
fair play would seem to require? 4"
As to the requirements concerning counsel imposed upon the states
by the clue process clause of the fourteenth amendment, the United
States Supreme Court has in a series of cases made it clear that the states
must appoint counsel for indigent defendants in capital cases; and as
to non-capital felony cases it all depends upon various factors: the
seriousness of the offense charged, the complexity of the issues involved,
the age, intelligence and educational background of the defendant, his
prior experience in criminal proceedings, how actively the trial judge
looked after his interests at the trial, and no doubt also whether the
12 The Freeman case is based partly on the ground that habeas corpus was the
wrong remedy, even assuming there was a violation of constitutional rights.
13 Colo. Const. art. 11, § 16: -In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel."
14 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 39-7-29 (1953), providing that district courts "may"

assign defense counsel for indigent defendents in felony or misdemeanor prosecutions
in the district courts.
14aFor a suggestion of this useful technique, see Frankfurter, J., concurring ill
Griffin v.

Illinois,

351 U.S. 12,

25-26 (1956).
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defendant is tried on a not-guilty plea or pleads guilty. 15 Applying these
tests to the two Colorado cases decided in 1957, it is not at all certain
that the United States Supreme Court would hold that the requirements
of due process were met, especially in the Freeman case, where the charge
was serious (kidnapping), the defendant was young (twenty-one), his
education was poor (sixth grade), and his prior courtroom experience
was meager. And that Court has held that due process may be violated
by a state in an appropriate non-capital case where the defendant, as
here, was not informed of his right to counsel, made no request for counsel, and pleaded guilty.'" Of course, the fact that Freeman's petition for
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court was denied after the
Colorado Supreme Court had affirmed his original conviction over his
contention that he was denied his right to counsel, was not a determination by the United States Supreme Court that clue process was not
violated. All that the denial of certiorari means is that, with all the pressure of business, the Court does not have time to consider the matter.'7
INFORMATION-VARIANCE BETWEEN INFORMATION AND PROOF

In one case the information charged that the defendant stole property owned by Hylda Howard; the proof showed that the owner's real
name was Hylda Vossen, though she was commonly known, to the defendant and others, as Hylda Howard. The supreme court sensibly
affirmed his conviction, over his contention of a fatal variance, on the
ground he could not possibly have been prejudiced in presenting his
defense.' s
INFORMATION-DUPLICITY

In another case, the defendant was charged with perjury, the infornation alleging in one count several lies told by the defendant on the
witness stand, all to the effect that the defendant was not guilty of
violating an injunction at place X because he was at all times at place Y.
15 See cases collected in B3oskey & Pickering, Federal Restrictions on State Criminal Procedure, 13 U. of Chi. L. Rev. 271, 279 (1946). The more recent cases are:
Pennsylvania ex rel. Herman v. Claudy, 350 U.S. 116 (1956); Gibbs v. Burke, 337 U.S.
773 (1949); Uveges v. Pennsylvania, 335 U.S. 437 (1948); Townsend v. Burke, 334 U.S.
Vade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 (1948);
736 (1948); Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728 (1948);
Bute v. Illinois, 333 U.S. 640 (1948); Gayes v. New York, 332 U.S. 145 (1947); Foster
v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134 (1947); De Meerleer v. Michigan, 329 U.S. 663 (1947); Carter
v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173 (1946).
16 Pennsylvania ex rel.
Herman v. Claudy, 350 U.S. 116 (1956), where defendant
was 21, had had 6 years of school, had one prior courtroom experience (where he had
no counsel), and was charged with several non-capital felonies.
17 The court's statement in the Freeman case 308 P.2d at 223. that denial of
certiorari shows there is no violation of due process, is thus clearly wrong.
Is Pownall v. People, 311 P.2d 715 (Colo. 1957).
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Is each falsehood a separate perjury, so that to join them all in one
count would be duplicity; or do all the falsehoods together constitute
one crime of perjury? The court held the latter, so that there was no
duplicity; and anyway, even if there was duplicity, the defendant raised
the issue too late, since he raised it for the first time during the trial."
TRIAL-EvIDIENCE

The Archina case2" involved several questions of evidence in criminal cases. A novel question was presented as to the competency of a
wife to testify against her husband, when she had married him abroad
in a civil ceremony for the sole purpose of enabling him to be admitted
to the United States, with the understanding that there should be a
later religious ceremony (never held) , and she had never slept with
him or otherwise consummated the marriage. The court held she was
not his "wife" for the purpose of the Colorado statute making a wife
incompetent to testify against her husband. The court also held that
for a deposition to be used at the trial, there must be a showing (not
here made) of the unavailability of the witness at the trial; and that
the trial court's admission of lurid photographs of various deceased persons, having no probative value and serving only to inflame the passions
of the jury, constituted prejudicial error.
In another Colorado case, the court reaffirmed its long-standing
19 Marrs v. People, 312 P.2d 505 (Colo. 1957). The court also stated that the question of whether a witness's falsehood is material (materiality being an element of
perjury) is a question for the court, not the jury.
20) Archina v. People, 307 P.2d 1083 (Colo. 1957).
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view that evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure 21(in
violation of the Colorado Constitution) is nevertheless admissible.
SENTENCE

22
Several cases arose in 1957 in the wake of the 1956 Smalley case.
In two cases the principle of the Smalley case was applied so as to require
a new sentencing. In one 23 a defendant, convicted in 1953 of burglary
at age sixteen, was sentenced to the penitentiary when convicted again
of burglary in 1956 at nineteen. The court held this sentence erroneous,
since the statute (before its amendment in 1957) required that he be
sentenced to the reformatory. In the other case,24 the court held that
the Smalley case applied, so as to void an habitual criminal sentence,
even though the defendant had previously been actually sentenced
(wrongly) when under age twenty-one to the penitentiary.
In two other cases2 the court held that the reformatory statute
involved in the Smalley case-which before 1957 required the trial judge
to sentence to the reformatory instead of the penitentiary males under
twenty-one convicted of felony (except for felonies involving life-imprisonment and murder and voluntary manslaughter), was in addition
inapplicable to robbery convictions, since the robbery statute (enacted
after the reformatory statute) has a special provision giving the trial
21 Williams v. People, 215 P.2d 159 (Colo. 1957). Though the trend among other
states in recent years has been toward making such evidence inadmissible, there has
been no indication that any of the Colorado justices are disposed to change the rule.
At all events, this was not a proper case to make a new rule, as the defendant, having
consented to the search, had waived his constitutional right.
22 Smalley v. People. 134 Colo. 360, 304 P.2d 902 (1956), which was concerned with
the word "felony" in the Colorado habitual criminal statute. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 39-13-1 (1953). providing for life imprisonment for one. convicted of a felony, who
has three times previously been convicted of a "felony". Smalley had three prior
convictions, but the first one was for burglary (normally, of course, a felony) committed when he was 19. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 39-10-1 (1953), provides that Colorado
criminal courts "shall" sentence to the reformatory (not the penitentiary) all male
persons between 16 and 21 on their first conviction for a felony, excepting murder,
voluntary manslaughter and crimes punishable by life imprisonment. It was held (4
to 3) that Smalley's first conviction was not for a "felony", so he had only two
prior felony convictions, so he was not an habitual criminal, so his life sentence was
excessive.
The Colorado Legislature amended Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 39-10-1 (1953), by Colo.
Laws 1st Reg. Sess. 1957, c. 120, so as to provide that the judge may sentence the
first offender under 21 either to the reformatory or to the penitentiary. The result
is that the crime may be a "felony" within Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 39-13-1 (1953).
even though the sentence may be a reformatory sentence, since the offense is now
"punishable" in the penitentiary, within the definition of Colo. Const. art. XVIII, § 4.
defining "felony" for all Colorado purposes. B3ut it may be expected that "Smalley"
cases will be troubling the courts for some time to come; the new law does not turn
past non-felony convictions into felonies.
23 Barrett v. People, 315 P.2d 196 (Colo. 1957).
24 Latham v. People, 317 P.2d 894 (Colo. 1957).
People, 316 P.2d 1043 (Colo. 1957); Romero v. Tinsley, 317 P.2d
25 Thompson v.
1043 (Colo. 1957).

Prints, Inc.

* Photo Copies
* Duplicating
• Reproductions

Phone AC. 2-9751
1437 Tremont

I

Denver, Colo.

Pickup and Delivery Service

JANUARY-FEBRUARY,

1958

DICTA

judge power to sentence convicted robbers under twenty-one to the penitentiary or reformatory in his discretion. Two maxims of statutory interpretation lead to this result: in the case of two conflicting statutes
(1) the later controls the earlier, and (2) the special controls the general. The court's decision is right under either maxim.
EXTRADITION

Several 1957 cases involved the validity of extradition proceedings,
where men were picked up in Colorado at the request of the governor
of another state. Colorado, like most states, has adopted the Uniform
Criminal Extradition Act.2 6 The Colorado statute, after providing for

the extradition of one who is charged with a crime in another state and
has fled to Colorado, omits specifically to state, as the Uniform Act
provides, that extradition applies to parole or probation violators. Two
Colorado cases held, however, that parole violators are none the less
extraditable; they are still "charged with crime" so long as they 2have
not satisfied the judgment of conviction by serving their sentence. 1
The United States Constitution, and federal statutes implementing
the Constitution, 28 provide for extradition in the case of one who commits a crime in one state and then flees to another state. They are silent,
however, on the situation of one, at all times out of a state, who yet
commits a crime within the state, as by shooting his victim across the
border, or by obtaining property by false pretenses through the mails,
or by failing to support his family after leaving the state where the
family lives. In such cases, he has not "fled from justice" to an asylum
state. The Uniform Act (adopted by Colorado), unlike the Federal
Constitution and statutes, sensibly provides for the situation, authorizing extradition. But in Matthews v. People,29 which was a non-fugitive
case (non-support), the Nebraska governor unfortunately, in asking
Colorado for the man's extradition, worded his requisition in terms of
federal law instead of Colorado law; so the supreme court let the man
go. This is at least consistent with an earlier Colorado case where the
Indiana governor, in another non-fugitive case, requested Colorado to
extradite a man under Colorado law, but the Colorado governor unfortunately ordered his arrest pursuant to federal law."0 The truth of the
matter, as Justice Knauss points out in his dissenting opinion in the
Matthews case, is that both cases pay too much attention to form-how
can the man possibly be prejudiced by such a minor and technical
mistake?
In another extradition case, 31 a man had been convicted of a felony
in Texas in 1945, had been conditionally paroled in 1951, had then
come to Colorado in violation of his parole, and had committed a burglary here, receiving a sentence to the Colorado penitentiary. In 1955,
while he was still a guest of Colorado in Canon City, Texas tried to
extradite him as a parole violator, and the Colorado district court re26 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 60-1-1 to 60-1-23 (1953).
27 Travis v. People, 308 P.2d 997 (Colo. 1957); Tinsley v. Woods, 313 P.2d 1006 (Colo.
1957). Another case, Cutting v. Geer, 313 P.2d 314 (Colo. 1957), allows extradition from
Colorado to Alaska, a territory rather than a state, in spite of the fact that the U.S.
Constitution on extradition, art. IV, § 2, cl. 2, speaks only of a "state", without men-

tion of a "territory".

28 U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2; 18 U.S.C. §§ 3182, 3194, 3195.
2 314 P.2d 906 (Colo. 1957).
30 Stobie v. Barger, 129 Colo. 222, 268 P.2d 409 (1954).
31 Seigler v. Canterbury, 318 P.2d 219 (Colo. 1957).

(1952).
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fused to allow his extradition (on grounds not here expressed). The
man having finished his sentence in Colorado, Texas in 1957 asked
again to extradite him for the same violation of the same parole. The
Colorado Supreme Court held that the 1955 action of the district court
was res judicata, so the man could not be extradited for the same matter
in 1957. It is true that res judicata is applicable to habeas corpus extradition proceedings, though only where the decision of the first proceeding is on the merits, rather than because of some defect or irregularity
in the extradition process.
APPELLATE REVIEW

The supreme court on several occasions in 1957 reiterated its statements of prior years that the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure have
no application to criminal proceedings; that a criminal defendant seeking review of his conviction on writ of error must file an abstract of
record and assignments of error; otherwise the writ of error will be
dismissed. 32 By way of contrast, the court held that the Rule of Civil
Procedure, rather than rules relating to criminal procedure, govern
the review of the trial court's action in a habeas corpus proceeding
brought by a convict, since habeas corpus is in the nature of a civil, not
a criminal, action."3 It seems quite plain that Colorado would do well
to adopt in the criminal field, as it has clone in the area of civil procedure, rules of criminal procedure based upon (though not necessarily
an exact copy of) the successful Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, 4
incorporating, where applicable to criminal cases, some of the sensible
rules relating to civil procedure.
FREE TRANSCRIPT FOR REVIEw

The United States Supreme Court in 1956 held, in Griffin v. Illinois,15 that the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause requires
that the state furnish an indigent defendant, who wishes to appeal his
conviction, with a free copy of the transcript of the trial proceedings,
in order to equalize justice as between the rich (who can obtain a
transcript and thus effectively appeal) and the poor (otherwise unable
effectively to appeal). In one 1957 case, the Colorado Supreme Court
recognized the binding effect of this case on Colorado, and remanded
the case to the district court for a determination of the question of the
convicted defendant's indigency.36
HABEAS CORPUS

Several cases dealt with the availability of the remedy of habeas
corpus to one who is serving his sentence after having been convicted
of a crime.37 In the Freeman case, already discussed on the question of
the right of counsel, the court held that habeas corpus is not a proper
remedy to upset a conviction obtained at a trial at which this right was
32 Rochon v. People, 306 P.2d 1080 (Colo. 1957); Armbeck v. People, 313 P.2d 715
(Colo. 1957); Williams v. People, 315 P.2d 189 (Colo. 1957). However, the court does
sometimes look at the merits of the defendant's case, in spite of the fact that the
defendant failed to use the correct procedure for review.
33 Barrett v. People, 315 P.2d 192 (Colo. 1957) (no abstract of record or assign-

ment of error).
34 See Scott, Criminal Procedure in Colorado, 22 Rocky Mt. I,. Rev. 221 (1950).
35 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
36 In re Patterson's Petition, 317 P.2d 1041 (Colo. 1957) (if indigent. one is entitled
to a free transcript or bill of exceptions).
37 308 P.2d 220 (Colo. 1957); Barrett v. People, 315 P.2d 192 (Colo. 1957); Farrell v.
District Court, 311 P.2d 410 (Colo. 1957). One case dealt with habeas corpus after
arrest and before trial: Oates v. People, 315 P.2d 196 (Colo. 1957).
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violated. The court nevertheless went on to consider whether the right
was violated, concluding it was not. The reason given was that habeas
corpus lies after conviction only if the trial court had no jurisdiction
over the crime or the defendant, or if the court imposed a void sentence.
Of course, the rule about the availability of habeas corpus in federal
courts after a federal conviction is expressed also in terms of jurisdiction,
yet the United States Supreme Court has held there is no "jurisdiction"
where the defendant's right to counsel is denied."8 Most states probably
follow the federal lead and allow habeas corpus. Perhaps the remedy
in Colorado is a writ of error coram nobis, addressed to the trial court;
or its modern equivalent, a motion to vacate the judgment of conviction.31 The important thing is that, in right-to-counsel cases, there be
some available remedy other than the writ of error.
DoUBl

iOI'ARDY
J

One unusual case involved the problem of double jeopardy.
Defendant was charged with embezzlement of public funds, was convicted,
and took his case to the supreme court for review. Before the supreme
court rendered a decision, the defendant was again charged in effect
with the same embezzlement, and the second trial began. Then the
supreme court reversed the first conviction. The second trial proceeded,
over the defendant's objections of former jeopardy, resulting in his conviction. He again applied for a writ of error. This time the supreme
court reversed on the ground of double jeopardy. While there is no
double jeopardy in a new trial conducted after the defendant's original
conviction is reversed, the new trial must begin after, not before, the
reversal takes place.
's Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). The Court there pointed out that there
must be some remedy other than appeal, since a defendant without counsel generally
finds it difficult or impossible to appeal.
89 Most jurisdictions would probably hold this remedy not available, because it is
generally allowed only to raise issues of fact not known at the trial, which if known
might have led to another result. In cases of criminal trials without counsel, it is
hard to find that there were any unknown facts.
40 Bustamante v. People, 317 P.2d 885 (Colo.

1957).
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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS
By HOMER H. CLARK, JR.
Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law
INTRODUCTION

The year 1957 saw relatively few reported cases in Colorado dealing
with domestic relations.' Most of these were of little importance as precedents. The most significant legal event in this field was the passage
of a comprehensive set of amendments to the statutes dealing with
divorce2 and annulment.' The divorce bill was vetoed by Governor
McNichols but the annulment bill became law.4 It is to be hoped that
the divorce bill will be reintroduced, passed and approved by the governor, since it makes many badly needed reforms. Both bills were drawn
by Colorado Bar Association committees, who should receive great credit
for the skillful execution of a difficult job. A detailed examination of
the new annulment statute is outside the scope of this paper, but some
reference will be made to its provisions in the appropriate section below.'
DIVORCE

AND

SEPARATE MAINTENANCE

Two important cases arose in this area of domestic relations. In one,
Carrollv. Carroll,6 the supreme court gave Colorado lawyers some muchneeded light on what constitutes mental cruelty in this state. The husband was plaintiff and alleged in his bill of particulars that his wife
had refused to attend social functions, church or to entertain in their
home, had disagreed and argued with the plaintiff, had failed to keep
house properly, and had been guilty of other conduct causing the plaintiff humiliation and distress. The trial court denied the divorce on the
ground that the plaintiff had failed to establish cruelty. The supreme
court reversed, saying that the proof did show cruelty, rather than mere
incompatibility. Although the kinds of conduct which may constitute
cruelty vary so widely that no two cases are just alike, this opinion does
contain some general language which is worth quoting because it suggests that the Colorado Supreme Court is willing to grant divorces for
conduct which does not meet the standards of cruelty which some more
strict courts might require:
"So far as peace of mind, happiness and good health is concerned, mental cruelty may be the most devastating type of
cruelty. As was said in an earlier case, it is a refined cruelty
which is sharper than the knife and more brutal than the fist.
Married persons should be responsible to their spouses for the
natural consequences of their words and actions, and if the conduct of defendant in this case was such as to cause disturbances
with plaintiff's ability to carry on his chosen profession, and in
addition thereto, bring about an impairment of health and rob
him of his peace of mind, then it is something more than mere
incompatibility. In some instances, it might be difficult to pinOnly cases decided during the calendar year 1957 will be discussed in this article.
2 House Bill No. 70, First Regular Session, Forty-first General Assembly (1957).
3 House Bill No. 77, First Regular Session, Forty-first General Assembly (1957).
4 Colo. Laws 1st Reg. Sess. 1957, e. 129, §§ 1-10, amending Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§§ 46-3-1 through 46-3-9 (1953).
5 See note 34, infra.
6 311 P.2d 709 (Colo. 1957).
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point mental cruelty and inferences may be allowed. Scrutiny
of defendant's testimony discloses a clear inference that she felt
herself superior in many ways to plaintiff, and that her environment was below her mental caliber. She admitted that she
understood that plaintiff's nature was unusually sociable and
responsive, and this leads to the inference that he is of a sensitive nature, and this should be a strong factor in determining
whether there has been cruelty within the meaning of our
divorce statute. This does not create a dual standard, that is,
one standard for the cultured and refined, and another for the
unrefined. While the state and society is always an interested
party in the maintenance of the marriage contract, it is not so
exacting as to insist that the marriage relation in all events
should continue, or that a home be maintained under circumstances that are more detrimental to society than a divorce." 7
In the writer's opinion, this decision takes a commendable step
toward bringing the official definition of cruelty into line with what the
trial courts are actually doing in many parts of the state. In the process,
it does come near to assimilating mental cruelty to incompatibility.
The second important case is Rodgers v. Rodgers,' which held that
permanent alimony and a division of property, granted some months
after the divorce decree became final, were outside the trial court's
jurisdiction. The supreme court stated that such relief must be given at,
or perhaps before, the time of the final decree. At the present writing,
a petition for rehearing in this case has been granted,' so that any comment would be premature. Whatever the result, the decision will be
most significant'for the administration of Colorado's divorce law.
One other divorce case10 held that the husband was domiciled in
Colorado, upon facts showing some contacts with other states. The same
case held that in awarding alimony the trial court should consider the
husband's existing income, not what he might expect to earn in the
future.
The single separate maintenance case decided during the year11 held
that the wife's action should not have been dismissed when she failed,
for lack of funds, to appear in Colorado for the taking of her deposition.
She was living in Chicago, and the court properly said that the information sought by the deposition could be obtained in other ways which
would not impose the expense and hardship of a special trip from
Chicago to Denver.
HUSBAND AND WIFE

The two cases on this subject were of little importance. One decision reiterated the Colorado rule that a conveyance is not presumed to
be in fraud of a spouse, in the absence of evidence to that effect. 12 Conversely, it was held in the other case that a wife could set aside a conveyance where it was in fraud of her rights.1 3
7 Id. at 711.

9 Colo. Bar Ass'n Adv. Sh. 493 (1957).
9 10 Colo. Bar Asi'n Adv. Sh. 19 (1957).
10 Watson v. Watson, 310 P.2d 554 (Colo. 1957).
11 Manning v. Manning, 10 Colo. Bar Ass'n Adv. Sh. 70 (Colo,
12 Bushner v. Bushner, 134 Colo. 509, 307 P.2d 204 (1957).
13 Zingone v. Zingone, 314 P.2d 304 (Colo. 1957).
S

1957).
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PARENT AND CHILD

The troublesome problem of the effect of a foreign custody decree
4
arose once in 1957. In Evans v. Evans"
the spouses had been divorced
in Wyoming, custody being given to the wife, who lived in Wyoming,
for nine months of the year and to the husband for the other three
months. The child's father remarried four years later and moved to
Denver. In 1956 he had the child under the Wyoming decree and refused
to return her to the mother at the end of the summer. The mother filed
a petition for habeas corpus in the Denver district court, the father
counterclaimed asking that custody be granted to him, and the court
denied the writ, giving custody to the father. The apparent ground
for the decision was the child's desire to remain with her father. The
supreme court reversed, and directed that custody be given to the mother.
It is not entirely clear what reason the court relied upon in reaching
this result. The supreme court first objected to the trial court's failure
to make findings as to the child's domicile, as to any change of circumstances since the Wyoming decree, or as to the mother's unfitness. The
court also referred to the fact that the father was in violation of the
Wyoming decree. It found that the child was domiciled in Wyoming
at the time the petition was filed.
If the decision stands for the proposition that there is no jurisdiction
to decide custody where the child is domiciled outside the state, even
though one parent is domiciled in Colorado and though both parents
are personally before the Colorado court, it may be very doubtful. No
Colorado statute governs on this point, and the common law authorities
are in some conflict. The Restatement of Conflict of Laws seems to take
the position that only the courts of the child's domicile have jurisdiction.15 The California case of Sampsell v. Superior Court"6 holds that
more than one state may have jurisdiction, and that the state of the
child's temporary residence may grant a custody decree. The United
States Supreme Court has held that a custody decree is entitled to full
faith and credit only if the parents have been personally served in the
jurisdiction granting the decree, regardless of the child's domicile." On
this point, therefore, the Evans opinion is unsatisfactory, since it fails
to consider the various authorities and choose unequivocally between
them.
There are two other well established grounds for the decision, however: (1) There was no finding that conditions had so changed since
the Wyoming decree as to justify a change in custody," and (2) The
father, who was asking for the change, was violating the Wyoming
decree in keeping the child beyond the three-month period. The Colorado Supreme Court in other cases has properly refused to grant a change
in custody in such circumstances in order to discourage divorced spouses
from shopping around for a favorable forum, such activities being
14 314 P.2d 291 (Colo. 1957).
15 Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 146 (1934): "Upon the legal separation of the
parents, by divorce or otherwise, custody of their child can be given to either parent
by a court of the state of domicile of the child." And see Id. § 117 (1934). But see
Id. § 148 (1934): "in any state into which the child comes, upon proof that the custodian of the child is unfit to have control of the child, the child may be taken from
him and given while in the state to another person."
16 32 Cal. 2d 763, 197 P.2d 739 (1948).
17 May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953), 26 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 205 (1954).
isRestatement, Conflict of Laws § 147, comment a (1934).
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extremely detrimental to the child's welfare.)
.11either of these two
grounds were the basis for the Evans case, there could be no question
of its correctness.
Quintrall v. Goldsmith21 settled a hard question of adoption law,
holding that a child who had been adopted twice could not inherit from
his first adoptive parents, in spite of a provision in the first adoption
decree that the adoptive parents could not disinherit him. The supreme
court found the provision valid because the adoption occurred before
the passage of the statute allowing the disinheriting of adopted children,' but the court said that the second adoption decree divested the
first adoptive parents of all legal rights and obligations. The court
recognized that there is authority to the contrary,22 but chose not to
follow it on the ground that it would create great difficulties in the
drafting of wills and distribution of property on death. The decision
seems to be in accord with the rationale of adoption, although it reads
into the first adoption decree a provision not found there,23 and gives
'9

Crocker v. Crocker, 122 Colo. 49, 219 P.2d 311 (1950).

For general discussion of

these problems, see Stansbury, Custody and Maintenance l[aw Across State Lines,
10 Law & Contemp. Prob. 819, 831 (1944): Ehrenzweig, Interstate Recognition of Custody Decrees, 51 Mich. L. Rev. 345 (1953).
20 134 Colo. 410. 306 P.2d 246 (1957).
21 Colo. R1ev. Stat. Ann.
§ 152-2-4 (1953). the critical portion of which was
enacted in 1941. Colo. Laws 1st Reg. Sess. 1941, c. 23., § 16.
22 E.g., In re Egley's Estate. 16 Wash. 2d 681. 134 P.2d 943 (1943).
23 The court states that the first adoption decree should be read to mean that
the adoptive parents must not disinherit the child "as long as the Viltses (the adoptive parents) stood in loco parentis." 134 Colo. at 416, 306 l'.2d at 248.
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the second decree the effect of cutting off rights accrued under the first,
without any language in the second decree explicitly so stating. The
willingness of the court to read provisions into decrees in this case,
where the result is to prevent an inheritance by an adopted child should
be contrasted with the court's reluctance to give effect to the express
words of the adoption statute where the result would be to protect an
adopted child's rights of inheritance.24 In this state as in others, the
courts have been far too slow to place the adopted child on an equal
footing with natural children where rights of inheritance are involved.
Two dependency cases of 1957 should be noted briefly. In the first,
Ortega v. Portales,2 the mother of an illegitimate child filed a dependency petition, alleging the father had failed to support the child, who
was born some eight years before. The juvenile court, where the petition was filed, held that the action was barred by the general three-year
statute of limitations. 6 The supreme court reversed, holding that the
gravamen of the action was the failure to support, that there was a continuing breach of duty, and the action was thus not barred by the
statute. Unfortunately, the supreme court failed to state whether the
juvenile court could order support retroactive to the child's birth, or
only over the preceding three years. This case also apparently means
that non-support is a proper ground for a dependency action, and that
the court is repudiating sub silentio its own remarks in Kearney v. Blue27
and other recent cases,28 to the effect that a child who is not being supported by its parents is not "dependent" as the statute defines that term.
The other dependency case, Geisler v. People," held that it is a

jurisdictional requirement, for dependency and contributory dependency actions, 30 that the child involved, as well as the petitioner, reside
in the county where the petition is filed.
1
Two other cases must be briefly mentioned. One, Tucker v. People,"
dealt with jurisdiction of county court in criminal non-support cases.
Rehearing has been granted in the action,3 2 so that comment would be
premature. The other case merely affirmed a trial court's refusal to
modify a custody decree, finding no abuse of discretion, 3 and is of
slight significance as a precedent.
MARRIAGE

AND

ANNULMENT

As has been indicated, the year saw an entirely new annulment
statute in Colorado, 34 dealing not only with the procedure in such cases,
but also with the substantive law of marriage. A comprehensive and
24 See, e.g., Russell v. Jordan, 58 Colo. 445, 147 Pac. 693 (1915), which the court
cites as holding that the adopted child can inherit from, but not through, his adoptive
parents. There is room for argument that this rule has been changed by the 1941
amendments to the intestacy law, now found in Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 152-2-4 (1953),
but this citation of Russell seems to indicate that the supreme court thinks the
Russell rule is still law in Colorado. For full discussion of this problem see Note.
26 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. 65, 68 (1953).
25 134 Colo. 537. 307 P.2d 193 (1.957).
26 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 87-1-9 (1953), covering "all other actions of every kind
for which no other period of limitation is provided by law."
27 134 Colo. 217, 301 P.2d 515 (1956).
28 See Carrera v. Kelley, 131 Colo. 421. 283 P.2d 162 (1955); and Foxgruber v. Hansen, 128 Colo. 511, 265 P.2d 233 (1954).
29 308 P.2d 1000 (Colo. 1957).
30 The court held that actions under both the dependency statute, Colo. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 22-1-9 (1953), and the contributory dependency statute, Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 22-7-2 (1953) are to be governed by the same rules, with respect to residence of the
child. The court seems to use the term "residence" as synonymous with "domicile"
in this case.
31 9 Colo. TBar Ass'n Adv. Sh. 527 (1957).
32 10 Colo. Bar Ass'n Adv, Sh. 19 (1957).
Strakosch v. Benwell, 310 P.2d 720 (Colo. 1957).
e4 Colo. Laws 1st Reg. Sess. 1957, c. 129. See note 5, supra.
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exhaustive definition of void and voidable marriages was enacted. 5 The
statute making miscegenation a crime and making miscegenous marriages void was repealed. 6 Other important changes in Colorado law
were made." The statute raises several complex questions which cannot
be discussed in this limited space.
The only case on marriage during the year was Archina v. People,8
a murder prosecution. In the trial court, the defendant's wife was
allowed to testify against him, and the question was raised on appeal
whether she was to be considered his wife for purposes of the statute
giving him the privilege of excluding her evidence- 9 The supreme court
held she was not, apparently limiting its definition of "wife" to apply
solely to this precise question. 4 The parties had been married by a civil
35 Colo. Laws 1st Reg. Sess. 1957, c. 129 §§ 1 and 3, which will eventually be found
in Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 46-3-1 and 46-3-3 (1953).
36 Although the legislature did not expre.,sly repeal Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 90-1-2
1953 making marriages between negroes and whiies void, this section was repealed by
implication, since Colo. Laws 1st Reg. Sess. 1957, c. 129, § 3 provides that "A marriage is void only if one or more of the following conditions existed at the time of the
marriage,'' anui the listed conditions do not inclide miscegenation.
overruled, so that a
37 E.g., Valdez v. Shaw, 100 Colo. 101, 66 P.2d 325 (1937) w\,as
child of a vo.d or voidable marriage is now legitimate, whether or not hs parents get
an annulment. See (olo. Laws 1st Reg. Sess. 1957, c. 1'9, § 5. And Owen v. Owen,
127 Colo. 358. 257 P.2d 581 (1953), requiring personal service in annulment suits, has
been overruled by Colo. Laws 1st ,eg. Sess. 1957, c. 129, § S. The new statute labels
annulment an action in rem.
:8 307 P.2d 1083 (Colo. 1957).
29 The statute provides that a wife shall not be examined for or against her
husband without his consent. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 153-1-7 (1953).
40 The court said, in concluding its discussion of the point: "Our decision here
is limited to an appl:caticn of ihe statute to the facts as disclosed by this record."
307 P.2d at 1094. Presumably this means that the court was not making a general
judgment about the validity of the marriage.
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ceremony in Italy, there being some doubt as to just where in that
country it was performed. But a marriage ceremony seems to have been
performed, and probably made the parties man and wife by Italian law.4
At least one reason for the marriage was to enable the husband to get
into the United States. The marriage was never consummated and a
later religious ceremony which had been contemplated never occurred.
In reaching its result, the court relied on two federal cases in which
marriages of this sort, contracted in order to enable one of the parties
to enter the United States, had been held to violate the immigration
laws. One of these cases held that no marriage had occurred, 42 but the
other refused to pass on that issue, holding merely that a marriage of'
this kind amounted to a conspiracy to enter the United States by frau(. 4 3
The Archina case assumes, without discussion, that marriage is
"divisible," that is, that a man and woman may be married for some
purposes and not others. The case must mean that although the relationship could not be annuled, 4 the parties could not be considered
man and wife for purposes of requiring one to give evidence against
the other. The reason for reaching this result, though not articulated
plainly, seems to have been that a statute designed to protect confidential communications between spouses (and thus insure marital harnony) 42 has no application where the relationship so lacks affection and
harmony that there is nothing to protect." ; Such a holding has the virtue
of construing the statute by reference to its purpose, but is open to the
objection that it imparts uncertainty to a status where certainty is desirable. There are so many other sources of uncertainty, however, that
41At one point the court says there is doubt whether the parties ever entered
a valid civil marriage, but later it is conceded. that they did. 307 P.2d at 1091, 1092.
The opinion could be a good deal clearer on this point. The court does not discuss the
conftiet of laws question.
42 United States v. Rubinstein, 151 P.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1945).
43 United States v. Lutwak, 344 U.S. 604 (1953). This case does not support the
rtsult reached in Archina.
44. Although there are few cases with facts like this one, there are several where
the "marriage" was entered into for an ulterior motive, such as to give a child a
name, to enable one of the parties to get or keep a job, or for other reasons. The great
majority of these cases hold the marriages valid. They are collected in a note, Sham
Marriages, 20 Univ. of Chi. L. Rev. 710 (1953). It is too bad that the Archina opinion
did not at least mention these decisions. A recent English case held a marriage valid
where contracted solely for the purpose of enabling one of the spouses to emigrate to
England. Kraft v. Silver, [19551 1 Weekly L. R. 728. noted in 69 Harv. L. Rev. 768 (1956).
in this case, the question arose in connection with the wife's suit for divorce. The
fact that the parties did not intend to perform the usual marital duties does not
invalidate the marriage in most cases. A leading case so holding is Estate of Duncan,
87 Colo. 149, 285 Pac. 757 (1930).
45 That this is the policy underlying the marital privilege, see McCormick.
Evidence 168, 169, 179, 150 (1954).
46 "It
is inconceivable that the legislature, in adopting the above statute, intended to preserve inviolate such strange relationships as that existing between Rose
and the defendant. That relationship was a coid, inanimate, lifeless relationship which
had its beginning and end in a preliminary civil contract, in the minds of the parties
amounting to nothing more than an agreement to marry at some time in the future.
This defendant cannot use this statute, designed and intended to protect and preserve
an ifistitution and status that from time immemorial has been the very foundation of
civilization and survival of the hinman race, as a shield to escape the consequences of
his unlawful acts." 307 P.2d at 1092. The peculiar thing about this policy argument
is that in many American jurisdictions, the privilege survives divorce, where the
relationship has become even more "cold, inanimate, lifeless" than it was in Archina.
And presumably it would exist, notwithstanding a separation, where no divorce had
occurred. See McCormick, Evidence 178 (1954). Perhaps the Archina opinion stands
for the principle that the privilege ends whenever the marriage is or has become an
empty relationship, in which the parties are not living affectiowtely together as
husband and wife normally do.
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perhaps it is illusory to think that people are entitled to have the law
governing their marital relationships stated plainly, in a manner intelligible to laymen.47 The new annulment statute is an attempt to provide an exhaustive list of the defects which impair the validity of marriages, thus providing a measure of certainty. Perhaps this statute,
which does not refer to any such defect as existed in the Archina case,
would be held to overrule that decision. 41 It certainly does seem to say,
in effect, that all marriages are valid except those labeled void or voidable by reason of the named defects. It is hard to escape the conclusion
that it was intended to establish a binding definition for all purposes.
47 See, e.g., Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957), in which a marriage had
ended for purposes of remarriage, but still existed as far as the husband's duty to
support his wife was concerned.
48 Colo. Laws 1st Reg. Sess. 1957, c. 129 §§ 1 and 3.
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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF EVIDENCE
By RONALD V. YEGGE
Member of the Denver firm
Yegge, Bates, Hall and Shulenburg
Below are briefed the 1957 Colorado decisions touching on evidence.
They are topically presented for convenient reference. The topics are
organizational and should not be considered conclusive.
ADMISSIONS

Ankcorn v. Boulder County Welfare Dep't' was an action by the
county welfare department to recover, from the personal representative
of a deceased old age pensioner, pension payments which the department
alleged the decedent was not entitled to because she owned certain
bonds. The defendant during the life time of the old age pensioner had
filed a suit as her conservatrix and in that suit alleged in the complaint
that the old age pensioner owned the bonds. The court held that the
defendant's personal representative was bound by the facts she had
alleged in the complaint which she filed as conservatrix.
Miller v. Hepner2 was an action by Miller against A. J. Hepner,
his wife Lillian and a corporation on an agreement between the Hepners
and the plaintiff whereby A. J. Hepner was to pay certain amounts to
the plaintiff and to Lillian Hepner. When A. J. Hepner died, Lillian,
as executrix of his estate, was substituted for him as a defendant. The
trial court refused to admit the plaintiff's testimony as to conversations
between himself, A. J. and Lillian, holding that exception (6) of the
Dead Man's Statutela would not apply because Lillian as well as plaintiff had an interest in the enforcement of the agreement. The supreme
court held, however, that Lillian's interest was adverse to plaintiff's.
She was almost the sole beneficiary of A. J.'s estate and if plaintiff
recovered against the estate the loss to the estate was, in substance,
Lillian Hepner's loss.
In Foster v. Feder,3 a suit to recover compensation for services rendered, the court held that the plaintiff's original complaint, which he
later amended materially, was admissible in evidence against him as an
admission against interest.
HEARSAY

(INDUSTRIAL

COMMISSION)

In Williams v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co.,4 a Workmen's Compensation case, the validity of claimant-plaintiff's marriage to a deceased
employee was the issue. A statement written by one person and signed
by another person, neither of whom testified, reciting facts showing the
marriage was not valid, was admitted in evidence. The supreme court
said the statement was "purest hearsay," not made competent by the
statute which provides that the Commission and its referees "shall not
be bound by the usual common law or statutory rules of evidence ....
The court expressly disapproved its statements in several cases which
indicated that an award of the Industrial Commission could not be
reversed because of the introduction of hearsay evidence.
1 307 P.2d 1110 (Colo. 1957).

22

314 P.2d 604 (Colo. 1957).
a Colo, Rev. Stat. Ann. § 153-1-2 (6) (1953).
3 316 P.2d 576 (Colo. 1957).
4 10 Colo. Bar Ass'n Adv. Sh. 95 (1957).
5 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 80-1-22 (1953).
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HEARSAY EXCEPTION

The last reported case of the year touching on evidence is the case
of Alexander Film Co. v. Industrial Comm'n. The issue was whether
or not a deceased employee was in the course of his employment at the
time of the accident that caused his death. The deceased had told a
fellow employee shortly before the accident that he was returning to his
motel for the purpose of performing certain tasks for his employer.
When crossing the street to the motel he was struck by a motor vehicle
and was killed. The court held that the statement of the deceased just
prior to the accident was a statement of design or plan which was within
an exception of the hearsay rule and was admissible in evidence. The
court pointed out that where such a statement is attended by the elements of a present existing state of mind and is made in the usual course
of things under circumstances excluding an ulterior purpose, the admission into evidence of the statement is proper.
JUDICIAL NOTICE

In Union Pacific R.R. v. Cogburn,7 the court stated that: "It is
common knowledge, of which we take notice, that the point of intersection of a railroad and a highway is a point of danger.''8
In the case of Mosko v. Dunbar,9 the supreme court, in affirming
the lower court's determination of the constitutionality of a statute barring sale of motor vehicles on Sundays, judicial notice was taken that
it was common knowledge that the automobile business had expanded,
grown, and developed since a prior decision of the court in 1938.
OPINION

Davis v. Bonebrake"6 was a suit against a physician for alleged malpractice in leaving a surgical sponge in the plaintiff's body. A nurse
testified that he was present when an operation was performed on the
plaintiff in which a substance was removed from her body which in his
opinion was surgical gauze. The supreme court held this testimony was
admissible whether the witness was professionally qualified or not. The
expression of an opinion or an impression is admissible unless the opinion is based on conjecture or hearsay. In the same case the court held
that evidence of two conversations between the plaintiff and the nurse
was admissible, not to prove the malpractice but to show when plaintiff
was first informed of the fact on which she based her case, the plaintiff
having alleged that the defendant had fraudulently concealed the facts
so that the statute of limitations had not run.
In the case of City of Boulder v. Burns," a case wherein the plaintiff sought damages as a result of stumbling over a water box owned by
the defendant, it was held that the decision of the trial judge on the
qualifications of a witness called to give opinion evidence is conclusive
unless clearly shown to be erroneous in matter of law.
PAROL EVIDENCE

In Payne v. Cummings,12 the court reiterated the general rule that
recission of a written contract by mutual consent of the parties to the
contract may be established by parol evidence.
6 Decided December 23, 1957.
7 315 P.2d 209 (Colo. 1957).
s Id. at 212.
9 309 P.2d 581 (Colo. 1957).
10 313 P.2d 982 (Colo. 1957).
11 312 P.2d 712 (Colo. 1957).
12 315 P.2d 818 (Colo. 1957).
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PRESUMPTIONS

In the case of People v. Scott,'1 in which a quo warranto proceeding
was involved, the court held that there is a strong presumption, particularly applicable to executive actions by the governor of the state,
that every public officer does his duty and that executive action may be
questioned or controlled by the courts only when such action is ministerial, and requires the exercise of neither judgment nor discretion.
In the case of Industrial Comm'n v. London & Lancashire Indemnity Co., 4 it was held in a Workmen's Compensation case that it was
not necessary to overcome the presumption against suicide by conclusive
evidence and further held that the burden of proof remained upon the
claimant to establish that the injury or death was not intentionally selfinflicted. Where evidence was offered by the employer from which the
conclusion of suicide could be reached, the inference against self-destruction was insufficient basis for an award in favor of the claimant.
Comment was made in Williams v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 5
that proof of a marriage ceremony and cohabitation until the death of
one raises a presumption of the validity of the marriage which the party
attacking it must overcome by competent evidence.
PRIMA FACIE EVIDENCE

Industrial Comm'n v. Havens,16 involved a claim of coronary occlusion and death caused by an accident in the course of employment. No
medical testimony was taken. The death certificate stating "coronary
occlusion" as the cause of death was admitted in evidence. The supreme
court held that the coronary occlusion was prima facie proved by the
admission in evidence of the death certificate; that causal connection
between the employee's over-exertion and death need not be proved by
expert medical testimony; that the claimant was not required to prove
by direct and conclusive evidence the cause of death as arising out of
employment and that the claimant had made a prima facie case by showing circumstances establishing a reasonable connection between the overexertion and the death, which was not refuted.
RECORDS
Mumm v. Adam, 7 was a suit to recover on a note and a check. The
defendant filed a counter-claim alleging that the plaintiff, his former
13 134 Colo. 525, 307 P.2d 191 (1957).
14 311 P.2d 705 (Colo. 1957).
15 10 Colo. Bar Ass'n Adv. Sh. 95 (1957).
16 314 P.2d 698 (Colo. 1957).
17 134 Colo. 493, 307 P.2d 797 (1957).
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partner, had failed to account for profits in the partnership. The books
and records of the partnership were put in evidence. The defendant
offered in evidence the income tax returns of the partnership for three
years. The plaintiff objected to their admission because they "might be

used for the confusion of the jury,'' 18 because they did not prove anything the defendant was obliged to prove, and because the original books
and records were the best evidence. The court held, however, that the
income tax returns were admissible because they sumnmarized the entries
in the books, because they would aid the jury in determining the difference between the total of sales shown in the books and the total of sales
revealed by sales sheets, and because of the inference that could be
drawn from the evidence that the parties recognized them as periodic
accountings between themselves.
In the case of Buchholz v. Union Pacific R.R.,' it was held unnecessary for the railroad, in proving a cross-claim for damages resulting from
an auto-train collision, to produce original entries of each transaction
concerned in damage to the railroad, the court stating that it was probably impossible to have each of the entries identified by the person who
originally made them. It was further held that the sworn testimony of
a proper supervisor to the effect that certain facts were shown by the

corporate records over which he had supervision was competent evidence. Referring to Rule 43 (f) of the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure, the court held that where the original records are complicated,
burdensome, or voluminous, summaries of such original records, prepared by competent persons, may be offered in evidence as the only

practicable way of receiving such proof.
It will be observed that in this review no comment is made relative
to criminal cases. A review of criminal cases is being reported elsewhere
in this issue. In the interest of space and to avoid duplication, such
cases are not here covered.
STATUTES

The legislature in House Bill No. 13320 provided that in a paternity
suit upon motion of the reputed father, the court shall order the mother
and child to submit to one or more blood grouping tests to determine
whether or not the reputed father can be excluded as being the father
of a child or children and the results of such tests may be received in
evidence, but only in such cases where exclusion is established.
In House Bill No. 25821 the General Assembly amended §152-5-31 of
the 1953 Revised Statutes relative to the taking of a deposition of a
witness to a will. This amendment specifically provides that a photostatic or photographic copy of the will be attached to the Commission
and the original will shall be retained by the court.
House Bill No. 27522 amended the Uniform Photographic Records
Act enacted in 1955 to provide that the records of the trust department
of a bank or trust company are not such records as are excepted under
the phrase in the original act as being "held in a custodial or fiduciary
capacity" and that such trust records could be reproduced and the
destroying of the original records would not effect the admissibility of
the reproduction into evidence.
18 Id. at 500. 307 P.2d at 801.
10 311 P.2d 717 (Colo. 1957).
20 Colo. Laws 1st Reg. Sess. 1957, c. 139.

21 Colo. Laws 1st Reg. Sess. 1957, c. 297.
22 Colo. Laws 1st Reg. Sess. 1957, c. 140.
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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF PROPERTY
By DONALD M. LESHER AND PHILIP G. GREGG
Mr. Lesher is a partner and Mr. Gregg an Associate of the
Denver firm Knight, Lesher & Schmidt. Both are Instructors
in the University of Denver College of Law.
This article does not purport to be a complete exposition of all
Colorado cases affecting property decided by the Supreme Court of Colorado in the past year. We have selected a few cases which we believe
are worthy of comment and have attempted to classify them roughly as
to their application within the field of property law.
RACE RESTRICTIONS

In Capitol Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n v. Smith,' the Colorado
Supreme Court considered the validity and enforceability of an agreement between the owners of certain lots which provided that lots owned
by them should not be sold or leased to colored persons and further
provided for forfeiture of any lots or parts of lots sold or leased in
violation of the agreement to such of the then owners of other lots in
said block who might place notice of their claims of record.
The plaintiffs alleged that they are colored persons of Negro extraction and that the interests or claimed interests of defendants claiming
under the agreement were without foundation or right and in violation
of the Constitution of the United States and that the agreement was a
cloud on the title which should be removed.
The district court found that the plaintiffs were the owners in fee
simple of the property involved and quieted their title free and clear
of any right of enforcement or attempted enforcement of the restrictive
covenant. The district court further decreed that the restrictive covenant, "may not be enforced by- this court as a matter of law as to enforce
same by this court would be a violation of the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution and
the enforceability of same is hereby removed as a cloud upon the title
2
of plaintiffs."
Counsel for defendants attempted to distinguish the case from pertinent Supreme Court cases 3 on the basis that the Supreme Court of the
United States in those cases did not have before it an agreement for
automatic forfeiture, nor did any of them create a future interest in
the land. Counsel for defendants contended that the agreement in question did not create a private anti-racial restrictive covenant but instead
created a future interest in the land known as an executory interest
which vested automatically upon the happening of the events specified
in the original instrument or grant. The defendants' contention then
went on to the effect that the trial court's failure and refusal to recognize such vested interest deprived the defendants of their property without just compensation and without due process of law. The supreme
court refused to draw the distinction, saying, "No matter by what ariose
terms the covenant under consideration may be classified by astute coun1 316 P.2d 252 (Colo. 1957).
2 Id. at 254.
3 Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1952); Shelly v.

Kraemer. 334 U.S. 1 (1947).
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sel, it is still a racial restriction in4 violation of the fourteenth amendinent to the federal Constitution.
PRIORITY or FEDERAL INCOME TAX LIEN

In United States v. Vorreiter,5 the question of relative priority of
federal income tax liens and mechanics' liens was considered by the
supreme court. Eldridge S. Price, a resident of Texas, owned improved
property in Larimer County. While he was such owner the United
States assessed income taxes against Price and his wife. On July 23,
1953, the collector of internal revenue at Austin, Texas, received income
tax assessment lists against the Prices. Other income tax assessment lists
were received by the same collector on August 27, 1953, and on December 3, and on December 31, 1953. Notices of liens for these taxes were
not recorded in Larimer County until December 16 and December 31,
1953.
Between August 6, 1953, and August 14, 1953, Vorreiter and others
entered into contracts to l)erform services and furnish materials in connection with improvements on the Price property in Larimer County.
Performance of these contracts was commenced on various dates starting
August 6, 1953, and ending August 20, 1953. The completion date was
some time in October of 1953. Lien statements were filed by the several
claimants between October 30, 1953, and December 5, 1953.
The United States took the position that federal tax liens are inferior only to prior recorded liens which are certain and perfected
before the federal tax lien attaches, and contended that the mechanics'
liens were inchoate until perfected by judgment. The Colorado Supreme
Court decreed priority to the respective liens in accordance with the
recording dates of the liens thereby giving priority to the mechanics'
liens over the federal tax liens. The decision of the Colorado Supreme
Court was reversed by the Supreme Court of the United States.6
ADVERSE POSSESSION

In Archuleta v. Rose,' the supreme court considered the character
of adverse possession. The subject of the controversy was a vacated street
in Irondale in Adams County. The street was platted and dedicated in
1889. For more than fifty years a fence had enclosed the property to
which the Archuletas held record title as well as the entire area comprising the former street. The plaintiff Rose held the record title to adjacent
property east of the fence. She brought an action against the Achuletas
to establish ownership of the one-half of the vacated street contiguous
to the land to which she held record title.
The Archuletas denied the Rose claim of title and alleged that they
and their predecessors had been in adverse possession of the strip for
more than eighteen years and that for more than twenty years the old
fence in question had been recognized as the true boundary line between
the properties. The lower court found the issues in favor of Rose and
entered judgment awarding Rose sixteen feet of the disputed east half
of the vacated street. As to the remaining fourteen feet of the thirty
foot strip, the trial court held that, due to misdescriptions not here
important, neither the Archuletas nor Rose had established title. No
error was directed to this ruling.
316 P.2d at 255.
134 Colo. 543. 307 P.2d 475. 34 DICTA 186 (1957).
United States v. Vorreiter. 78 Sup. Ct. 19 (1957).
7 315 P.2d 201 (Colo. 1957).

4
3
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One Trippel, called as a witness for the Archuletas, testified that
he had owned the property in controversy from 1931 to November, 1937,
and that he farmed the strip in dispute Lip to the old fence each year
except in 1936 and 1937, which were dry years with no well water on the
place. He further testified that he did not consider the old fence to be the
actual east boundary of this property, that he could not make claim and
never had made claim to ownership of the area which was supposed to be
a street and that he temporarily farmed the area which had been a street
because nobody else was using it. The court held that Trippel's testimony
negatived any intent on his part to claim ownership or to hold the property as his own hostile to the claims of all others. The supreme court held
that the disclaimer of Trippel was fatal both to the claim based upon
adverse possession and to that based upon acquiescence in a boundary.
The court said: "The very essence of adverse possession is that the possession must be hostile, not only against the true owner but against the
world as well."'
In the lower court the Archuletas petitioned for the appointment
of a commission under the statute 9 to determine the true boundary.
The trial court denied the request and the supreme court affirmed the
trial court's decision in this respect on the basis that there was no dispute
as to the location of the boundaries of the vacated street or the fence,
so the act was inapplicable.
RIGHTS OF UNKOWN PERSONS

Bowen v. Turgoose,10 was an action to enjoin the defendants from
placing bars, gates and locks on what the plaintiff alleged -was a public
road running through lands owned by the defendants. The Ward Gulch
Road was used by the public continuously from 1888 until 1953 when
the defendants blocked it. The road, which runs through by the defendants' land, was a public road prior to the issuance of a United States
patent in 1892 to the predecessors in title.
The defendants took the position that the plaintiff's action was
barred because of a quiet title decree embracing the defendants' land
entered more than seven years prior to the institution of the plaintiff's
case and that a public trustee's deed issued in 1926 under foreclosure of
the land now owned by the defendants precluded the action.
The court pointed out that neither the plaintiff, his predecessors
in interest, nor the public were parties to the quiet title action and that
the making of "unknown persons" parties defendant in the action was
not sufficient to cut off the rights of the public in and to an easement.
The court cited the Utah case of Hammond v. Johnson,"t which held
that an action to quiet title determines only that the prevailing party
has title superior to, or good against the title asserted by his adversary,
and the judgment affects no one but the parties claiming by, through
or under them, and does not affect any rights which the state or any
other person, not a party or claiming under a party, has or could assert
to the property in question.
With reference to the public trustee's deed the court held that public
easements are not subject to the bar of the statute of limitations.
8 Id.

at 203.
9 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 118-11-1 et seq. (1953).
10 314 P.2d 694 (Colo. 1957).
1194 Utah 35, 75 P.2d 164 (1938).
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TAX TITLES

Three cases decided by the Colorado Supreme Court during 1957
involving tax titles are worthy of comment.
In Blue River Co. v. Rizzuto,' 2 the supreme court held that the
failure of the county commissioners of Summit County to select a newspaper of general circulation published in said county, in which the
treasurer should publish the delinquent tax list, invalidated a subsequent
tax sale and the treasurer's tax deed. The uncontradicted evidence was
that the county commissioners did not make a selection of the Summit
County Journal, the paper in which the delinquent tax list was published, and moreover the owner of the Journal testified that there was
no contract entered into between him and the county commissioners.
The court held that the selection or designation of a newspaper for the
pulblication of delinquent tax lists is jurisdictional.
The case has excited considerable comment and voices have been
heard to proclaim that from now on no tax title is safe. The authors,
however, are of the opinion that the case merely illustrates one of the
possibilities that gives rise to the universal opinion among Colorado
lawyers that title based upon a treasurer's deed is unmarketable until
nine years after the recording of such treasurer's deed. The plaintiff
brought his quiet title action before his nine year period had elapsed
for the purpose of rendering merchantable a title that was unmerchantable because it was a tax title and, when his action was opposed, found
out why his title was unmerchantable.
In Jacobs v. Perry,,3 the plaintiff brought an action to quiet title
to seven mining claims. Her title was derived from treasurer's (leeds
issued February 25, 1938. The plaintiff filed her action sixteen years
and two months after the date of the treasurer's deeds. The defendants
claimed title by adverse possession under the eighteen year and twenty
year statutes of limitations and seven years possession under color of
title and payment of taxes.14 They also set up the defenses of estoppel
and laches. The court held that the treasurer's deeds created virgin
titles to the mining claims clear of all prior titles, liens, rights of possession or other claims.
Because Jacobs had a virgin title commencing sixteen years and two
months prior to the filing of the action, the court took the position
that the defendants could not establish a sufficient time period under
either the eighteen year or the twenty year statutes. Further, the defendants could not prevail on the seven year statute because they had no clear
title since the deed expressly excepted the mining claims and because
the plaintiff had paid all taxes "legally assessed" against the mining
claims.
The property had been subject to a double assessment, one in the
name of the plaintiff and the other in the name of the defendants. Both
assessments were paid. The court took the position that the assessment
in the name of the defendants was an unlawful assessment and the taxes
based thereon were not legally assessed because the defendants were
strangers to the title.
And, since the defendants were trespassers after February 25, 1938,
they could not assert the defense of estoppel because they were not inno12 312 P.2d 1.023 (Colo. 1957).
13 313 P.2d 1008 (Colo. 1957).
14 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 118-7-6 (1953).
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cent persons, but deliberate trespassers. With respect to the defense of
laches, the court said that it is not available in a quiet title action. The
court further pointed out that courts will not invoke equitable defenses
to destroy legal rights where statutes of limitations are applicable.
Another case involving a quiet title action brought to confirm a
tax title is Harrison v. Everett.15 Harrison, plaintiff in the lower court.
claimed title to certain property. The origin of his title was a treasurer's
(feed dated, acknowledged and recorded on March 15, 1938. Chaffee
County on January 29, 1945, had conveyed the property to Solomon
Grodal. By quit claim deed recorded February 5, 1953, Solomon Grodal
conveyed the property to the .Harrisons. The defendants claimed title
to a part of the property by virtue of adverse possession over a period
of approximately fifty years.
The court held that the issuance of a valid treasurer's deed created
a virgin title erasing all former interests in the land. More specifically
the court said that "title by adverse possession vanishes when the treasurer issues his deed in accordance with law for unpaid taxes.''16 The
court stated further that in order for the defendants to start a new prescriptive title they must prove adverse possession commencing with the
29th day of July 1945, which was the date on which the property was
conveyed by Chaffee County to Solomon Grodal. The commencement
of adverse possession could not have occurred during the period from
March 15, 1938, when the county acquired title by the treasurer's deed,
nor at any time subsequent to that time and before January 29, 1945,
at which time the county conveyed the property, because there could
be no adverse possession against the government. This left the defendants short a number of years on which to build another prescriptive title.
Lacking a prescriptive title the defendants were without a defense
because of the rule of law of Bennett v. Morrison,l" which held that the
defendant in a suit to quiet title cannot question the right of the plaintiff unless he can show title in himself.
308 P.2d 216 (Colo. 1957).
16 Id. at 219.
17 78 Colo. 464. 242 Pac. 636 (1925).
15
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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF TORTS
By EUGENE S. HAMES AND WILLIAM J. MADDEN
Mr. Haines is a partner and Mr. Madden an associate in the
Denver firm, Wood, Ris and Haines.
During the period of January 1, 1957, to December 31, 1957, a considerable number of cases involving tort questions were decided by the
Colorado Supreme Court. In this article we have selected those cases
which involve unusual factual situations or unusual legal problems not
heretofore decided or well established in this jurisdiction. We have also
tried, insofar as possible, to classify the cases according to subject matter
or type of action. Other cases, which have not been deemed significant
enough for extended discussion have been footnoted and a few have
been omitted entirely.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION

In Western Casualty and Surety Co. v. Swort,' a truck driver, who
had turned the wheel of his truck over to an incompetent non-employee,
was held entitled to receive the benefits of compensation for injuries
received when the truck collided with another vehicle. The supreme
court, two justices dissenting, held that his injuries arose out of and in
the course of his employment, although the employer had refused to
hire the non-employee because he did not have an operator's license.
The only Colorado case relied upon by the majority is Whiteside v.
Harvey,2 in which the court found the employer liable for injuries to a
third person caused by the negligence of a non-employee driver, applying
the constructive identity doctrine. The dissenting opinion comments
on the inapplicability of the Whiteside case and cites several cases which
would have supported a contrary ruling. The issues involved in the
two cases are not similar. In the Whiteside case the third party could
recover only if the employer on some theory was accountable for the
negligence of the non-employed driver. In the Swort case the issue was
simply whether the claimant had so abandoned the work he was hired
to do that he was no longer engaged in his employment.
In Vanadium Corp. v. Sargent,3 seven questions were decided by
the supreme court, three of which are important enough to be discussed
here. The first question was whether there was sufficient evidence of
causative aggravation of a pre-existing injury to uphold the award of
compensation. In upholding the award the court stated that evidence
of accident coupled with medical testimony that the accident described
"probably" caused present disability and aggravation of pre-existing
injury is sufficient. Second, the court held that the claimant's failure
to follow the statutory procedure 4 in selecting a private physician did
not bar recovery of compensation benefits but did bar recovery of the
expenses of the doctor selected by the employee. The employer, who
had directed the employee to a certain physician, gave the claimant
permission to change doctors, which the claimant did. The court stated
that while the employer waived any objection he might have had, he
could not waive the right of the Commission nor of the insurer to demand
1 134 Colo. 421, 306 P.2d 661 (1957).
2 124 Colo. 561, 239 P.2d 989 (1951).
3 307 P.2d 454 (Colo. 1957).
4 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 31-12-12 (1953).
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statutory compliance. Third, the court found it was not error to refuse
the employer's and the insurer's right to cross-examine a doctor, who
had submitted a medical report to the Commission, on the basis that
there was no statement in the record that the Commission had admitted
or considered the report. It is interesting, however, to note that the
statute quoted in the opinion," gives any party the right of cross-examination, if any ex parte evidence is received by the Commission.
In Industrial Commission v. Colorado Fuel and Iron Corp.,6 claimant, in the course of his employment was sitting on an I beam, eighteen
feet above the ground when he suffered cerebral thrombosis. He fell,
suffering burns to his hand and paralysis, resulting in total permanent
disability. A final award of the referee which was sustained by the Commission was for total disability. Both the referee and the Commission
found that the degree of disability resulting from the tall and burns
was fifteen percent as a working unit, which superimposed on the claimant's pre-existing infirmity, had rendered him permanently and totally
disabled. The referee found that paralysis was due to thrombosis, which
was not caused by any condition of his employment, and that this
paralysis rendered him permanently disabled. The district court set the
award aside, claiming there was evidence to sustain it. On appeal, the
cause was reversed and remanded with instructions to the district c*ourt
to return the case to the commission with instructions to enter an award
for fifteen percent total disability. The instructions seem inconsistent
with the remark of the court that: "There is no evidence that the fall
was caused by any condition of the employment or by overwork or
over-exertion in the performance of work..... .Perhaps the inconsistency can be explained, however, by the court's reference to the doctrine
that an injury is compensable if the worker is subjected to unusual risk
due to the position in which he has to work.
In Industrial Commission v. London and Lancashire Indemnity Co.8
the plaintiff's husband was found lying, seriously injured, on the employer's premises at 5:30 p. in. A window on the fourth floor was open,
all lights in the employer's seven-story building were off, except one on
the first floor and all other windows were closed and bolted. Decedent's
normal working hours had been 8:00 a. in. to 4:30 p. m. The widow and
son, plaintiffs, sought workmen's compensation alleging that the injury
and resulting death "arose out of" and "in the course of" his employment. The employer contended the workman had committed suicide.
The Commisison, in granting the award, found that the defendant had
failed to establish by conclusive evidence that the decedent had cominitted suicide. The district court reversed the Commission and on
appeal the reversal was affirmed. The supreme court reiterated that
the claimant is burdened with proving that (1) an accident occurred
and that it (2) arose out of, and (3) in the course of the decedent's
employment. The court further stated that there was nothing in the
compensation act which creates a statutory presumption of accident in
unwitnessed events resulting in a workman's injury oi death and that,
while there is a presumption against suicide, it is not an evidentiary
substitute for (2) and (3) above.
In the case of State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Industrial CommisaId.
6 310
7 Id.
8 311

§ 81-14-3.
P.2d 717 (Colo.
at 719.
P.2d 705 (Colo.

1957).
1957).
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sion,9 the plaintiff's husband died as a result of injuries received while
playing football for Fort Lewis A. & M. The decedent had been working
part time at a filling station when he enrolled in school, but quit this
work for work at the college having different hours but equivalent pay,
so that he could play football. An award of compensation by the Commission was reversed on appeal. The court held there was no evidence
that the decedent's job was the consideration for his playing football;
therefore, there was no contract to play. If there was no evidence of a
contract, there was no employer-employee relationship upon which compensation could be granted. The court distinguished University of
Denver v. Nemeth1° on the grounds that in the latter case there was
direct evidence presented that the claimant's job was the consideration
for his football playing.
In Industrial Commission v. Newton Lumber & Alfg. Co." claimant
suffered an injury which arose out of and in the course of his employment. After the employee had been hospitalized for some time, the
employer filed his first report of the accident and the carrier filed its
denial; but the notice of the carrier's denial was never received by tile
employee due to a mistake made by the employer. The employee finally
filed his claim more than six months after the injury.12 The supreme
court reinstated the award, which had been vacated by the district court
9 314
10i27

P.2d 288 (Colo. 1957).
Colo. 385, 257 P.2d 423 (1957).
1' 314 P.2d 297 (Colo. 1957).
12 Colo. Rex'. Stat. Ann. § 81-13-5 (1953) provides that the right to compensation
shall be barred unless a notice claiming compensation is filed within six months after
the injury.
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finding that the claimant had established a reasonable excuse for tile
late filing. The court stated that since the employer was aware of the
injury and knew the details of the claimant's hospitalization, the employer was not prejudiced by the late filing of the claim. The court
reaffirmed the rule that the burden of proving prejudice was upon the
employer.
The next two cases are treated together as they both involve claims
allegedly based upon over-exertion. In Industrial Commission v.
Havens,3 the claimant's husband, a truck driver, helped unload the
contents of his truck at its destination. The work took four hours and
involved unusually heavy exertion for him. During this work period,
the decedent's leg was injured when a hand car broke loose and hit
him. He continued working, apparently recovering. After lunch, he
started on his way in the truck. Ten minutes later he was found dead.
No medical examination of his body was made although the coroner
certified the death was caused by "coronary occlusion." The decedent
had no history of heart disease. The claimant introduced no medical
evidence that over-exertion causes coronary occlusion. Defendants, appealing from the district court's award which set aside the Commission's
denial of award, based their ground for reversal solely on this last point.
The award was affirmed on appeal. First, it should be noted that the
referee judicially noticed that a coronary occlusion does not usually
result from over-exertion. The court stated that if the facts are undisputed, the entire question is one of law for the court and that the court
was not bound by the Commission's conclusion. Second, the court, while
admitting that the causal connection between coronary occlusion and
exertion had to be established, held that medical testimony was not
necessary, if the claimant shows "circumstances establishing a reasonable connection between the over-exertion.., and the subsequent death
by heart failure. ' 11 3a A concurring opinion summarized the majority's
holding by quoting from other cases, which from timely sequence of
events, creates a presumption of permissible inference of causation, which
the employer must rebut. The dissent by three members of the court
would have denied compensation, on the basis that there was no evidence
offered to establish that the claimant's death was caused by over-exertion.
In Bennett v. Durango Furniture Mart,4 an opinion written by
one of the justices who dissented in the Havens case, the court held that
whether the death of the employee resulted from over-exertion was a
question to be decided by the referee, and that since the evidence was
such that reasonable men could draw different inferences, the referee's
ruling should not be disturbed. The majority distinguished the Havens
case on a factual basis. Apparently the test as to whether there is overexertion is whether the claimant or the decedent customarily exerted
himself in his employment in the same manner that he did at the time
of his injury or death. If he was exerting himself in the customary way,
then there is no over-exertion.
314 P.2d 698 (Colo. 1957).
1 a Id. at 702.
'4 10 Colo. Bar Ass'n Adv. Sh. 118 (1957).
13
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In the case of Cain v. Industrial Commission," the claimant petitioned the Commission to reopen his case, in which he had originally
been awarded compensation, because he felt his disability had increased
resulting in a change of condition. His doctor advised against additional
surgery, although he did find an increase in disability. The employer's
doctor felt that exploratory surgery was necessary to determine (1)
what should be done and (2) whether any of claimant's disability was
actually attributable to his original injury. The claimant refused the
employer's demand that he submit to exploratory surgery, although he
had co-operated in the past. The supreme court reversed the district
court's denial of additional compensation. The court held that exploratory surgery was not contemplated under the applicable statute 16 because
such surgery was not necessarily free of unusual risks and was not calculated to effect a cure.
Jacobson v. Doan,17 decided that a workman, suing at common law
for injuries resulting from the negligence of employees of the workman's
special employer, was entitled to recover an amount not exceeding
$10,000;18 that the subrogee insurance carrier, which paid compensation and medical expenses for the general employer, was entitled to a
compensation refund only; and, that the "right of control" test determined whether the servant was "loaned" to the special employer. The
court held that a defense based on the fellow servant doctrine was taken
away by statute. 9 If the special employer and the employee were both
under workmen's compensation and this had been established at the
trial, the defense that the injuries were caused by a fellow servant would
20
have been available.
GUEST STATUTE

In Hailer v. Gross,2 1 the plaintiff, a nineteen-year-old girl, while
riding as a guest in a car driven by the defendant, was injured. For
several hours prior to the accident she had freely participated in a drinking party with the defendant driver and admitted that both she and the
driver were intoxicated at the commencement of the ill-fated trip. She
complained of the driving, but although she had several opportunities
to get out of the car, did not do so. The supreme court in reversing the
trial court's denial of the defendant's motion for directed verdict at the
close of the plaintiff's case, held that the plaintiff had assumed the risk
as a matter of law. The court stated that although the plaintiff was a
minor, she had the usual and ordinary faculties of an adult, which included knowing the effect of intoxication on a driver. The court approved an instruction offered by the defendant which set forth the
defendant's theory that the plaintiff had assumed the risk of injury and
was contributorily negligent.
The case of Valdez v. Sams," made no mention that it involved the
guest statute, but it did involve the question of wilful and wanton disregard of the rights of others, so we include it here. This is a case of
315 P.2d 823 (Colo. 1957).
Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 81-12-12 (1953).
17 10 Colo. Bar Ass'n Adv. Sh. 108 (1957).
18 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 80-6-4 (1953).
19 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 80-6-1 (1953).
20 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 81-3-3 (1953).
., 309 P.2d 598 (Colo. 1957).
22,307 P.2d 189 (Colo. 1957).
'5
16
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first impression in Colorado. The plaintiff had obtained a default judgment against the defendant based upon a complaint, which-alleged
wanton, wilful and reckless disregard of the rights of others. The plaintiff presented no evidence at the hearing on the default judgment on
the issue of wanton and reckless disregard. In the meantime, the defendant had obtained a discharge in bankruptcy. The supreme court
held that the discharge x 'as effective as against the judgment. The court
held that you must (1) present evidence of wantonness and recklessness,
and (2) the trial court must make a specific finding of recklessness before such a judgment will not be discharged in bankruptcy.
The importance of Noakes v. Gaiser, 21 is that the case leaves two
legal areas open to speculation. The case was affirmed on appeal by
operation of law since the court was equally divided. The justices who
affirmed wrote no opinion. Only two dissenting opinions were reported.
i1n -the first, Judge Holland indicates that "wilful and wanton conduct,"
as used in the automobile guest statute, is not actually "negligence."
If this were to become the opinion of the majority of the court, would
contributory negligence and assumption of risk be good defenses to
wilful and wanton conduct? In the second, .Judge Frantz, while admitting
that, "The overwhelming weight of authority sustains this type of legislation (guest statute) on the theory that it finds sanction in the proper
exercise of the police power." argues persuasively that the guest statute
is unconstitutional. Is it possible that this dissenting opinion, may, at
some time in the future, become the opinion of the najority of the court?
The supreme court decided in Green v. Jones, 4 that a two-year-old
child was, as a matter of law, incapable of becoming a guest in an automobile driven by another. Concluding that the applicability of the
guest statute2 - depended upon the presence of two factors, namely, express or implied invitation and formal acceptance, the court judicially
noticed that the child was not capable of accepting an invitation.
AUTOMOBILE v.

RAILROAD

Buchholz v. Union Pacific R.R.2 ; is a case in which the plaintiff's
father was killed when he drove the plaintiff's truck onto a railroad
track and was struck by the defendant's train. The father's view of the
track and train was severely limited by obstructions. There was evidence
that a signal light was not working properly, although the father had
stopped before driving upon the track. The supreme court affirmed
the trial court's direction of a verdict in favor of the defendant railroad
on both the plaintiff's claim and the defendant railroad's counterclaim.
The majority imposed a high degree of' care on the part of the driver of
an automobile when he approaches a railroad track, especially when
the view of the track is obstructed, possibly necessitating that the driver
get out of the car and look up the track if he is not sure. The dissenting
opinion pointed out that if there was a duty imposed upon the plaintiff,
there was an equal duty imposed upon the defendant railroad company
since the defendant knew that a sixty-mile an hour train passing over
heavily travelled highways through a small town creates a dangerous
situation.
23 315 P.2d 183 (Colo. 1957).
'4 10 Colo. Bar Ass'n Adv. Sh. 113 (1957).
2;, Colo. ]Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-9-1 (1953).
26 311 P.2d 717 (Colo. 1957).
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In Union Pacific R.R. v. Cogburn,2 7 the plaintiff's automobile, with
its lights on, plunged headlong into the side of a box car blocking a
highway crossing at night. The train to which the boxcar was connected
had blocked the highway for some time. The supreme court reversed
the trial court and directed a verdict in favor of the defendant, because
the plaintiff was contributorily negligent as a matter of law. The court
aligned itself with those courts which have held that the length of time a
train blocks a crossing is not determinative of the railroad's negligence
and further stated that there was no excuse in the law for not being
able to see a boxcar blocking a highway, unless conditions are so deceptive that one cannot see a train at night by the aid of normal headlights. The court reiterated and affirmed the "assured vision rule," stated
in Ridenour v. Diffee,2s that it is negligence, as a matter of law, to drive
an automobile at such speed that it is not possible to stop within the
distance illuminated by headlights. 20
v. AUTO"0
In Jacobsen v. McGinness ' the supreme court held that a person
driving fifty miles an hour who enters a cloud of dust created by a
vehicle moving ahead in the same direction is guilty of negligence as a
matter of law, if he ends up on the wrong side of the road and collides
with another car.
AUTO
3

Kendall Transport v. Jungck32 severely limited the application of
Bennett v. Hall, 33 a case in which the court had held that the plaintiff

on a through highway was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter
of law, by stating:
"That decision was by a divided court with two judges not
participating, and the result there obtained, to say the least,
strained to the utmost the generally accepted rule that this court
will not disturb the findings of court or jury on the question
34
of . . .contributory negligelce.

This decision is sound in view of the harshness of the earlier case.
AUTO V. PEDESTRIAN

Only two points raised in Judd v. Aragon35 need to be commented
on. First, the court adopted section 479 of the Restatement of Torts, in
its entirety, on the doctrine of last clear chance. Second, the court stated
that, "Defendant's headlights were on low beam, as requied by law."
But, in Union Pacific R.R. v. Cogburn, the court stated:

"There was no law requiring plaintiff to have his headlights focused
27 315 P.2d 209 (Colo. 1957).

"s 133 Colo. 467, 297 P.2d 280 (1956).
29 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4-98 (1953)

provides that headlights should illuminate

350 feet on high beam and 100 feet on low beam.
30 See Peterson v. Kessler, 308 P.2d 610 (Colo. 1957) (holding that it is a question
of fact whether a fellow who admits visibility is "nil" and who runs into another party
is guilty of negligence); Jacobsen v. McGinness, discussed infra, which apparently
holds that such conduct is negligence as a matter of law: Smith v. Brase, 309 P.2d
1006 (Colo. 1957), which holds that an instruction on the emergency doctrine, to be
correct, must exclude emeigencies created by the negligence of the person confronted
with the emergency.
31311 P.2d 696 (Colo. 1957).
32 316 P.2d 1052 (Colo. 1957).
33 132 Colo. 419, 290 P.2d 241 (1955).
.4 316 P.2d at 1053.
35 316 P.2d 250 (Colo. 1957).
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low, common sense would dictate that under the conditions as he described them, his lights should have been bright."36
Dennis v. Johnson17 held that a pedestrian jay walking across a
street was guilty of negligence as a matter of law. Only one previous
Colorado case, Fabling v. Jones,38 has so held. The court further held
that an instruction of last clear chance could not be given to a jury
unless "subsequent" negligence of the defendant be shown, i.e., negligence which follows the plaintiff's negligence in placing himself in
inextricable peril.
3

MALPRACTICE "

40

In Beadles v. Metayka the plaintiff was placed on an operating
table in the defendant's hospital and defendant anesthetist had rendered
plaintiff unconscious. The plaintiff was propped on his side by a hospital orderly at the order of the surgeon and he promptly fell off the
table when all parties had their backs turned. Judgments against the
surgeon and in favor of the defendant anesthetist and hospital were
affirmed on appeal. The court held (1) that the surgeon's responsibility
begins when he first asserts control in the operating room which point
may be somewhat flexible in time, but if he does assert control over a
hospital orderly, the surgeon is liable for his negligence and not the
hospital; and (2) the negligence of an anesthetist is a question of fact
for the jury, although the court admitted that under prevalent practice,
an anesthetist has a duty to make chart entries and of necessity this
diverts attention from the patient. Whether the anesthetist was an independent contractor was left undecided.
MISCELLANEOUS CASES

New Brantner Extension Ditch Co. v. Ferguson4 holds that before
a person who builds a dam can be liable for damage caused by its
overflow, he must be shown to have been negligent. Unless there is
a distinction between a dam and a reservoir, this case has apparently
overruled the absolute liability doctrine of Fletcher
v. Rylands4 which
4
had been followed in several early Colorado cases. 1
In City of Boulder v. Burns44 plaintiff sustained injuries when she
fell, outside of the city limits, into a pit maintained for a water meter
36 315 P.2d at 216.
37 317 P.2d 890 (Colo. 1957).
3s 180 Colo. 144, 114 P.2d 1100 (1941); cf. Pueblo Transportation Company v. Moylan.
123 Colo. 207, 226 P.2d 806 (1951).
39 Davis v. Bonebrake, 313 P.2d 982 (Colo. 1957), involved a fact situation in which
a sponge or similar material was left in the abdomen of the plaintiff after an operation. An important procedural dispute arose between the majority and dissenting
opinion. The upshot of the majcrity opinion is that there are times when fraud need
not be plead with particularity, although seemingly required by Rule 9 of the Colorado
Rules of Civil Procedure.
40 311 P.2d 711, 34 DICTA 351 (Colo. 1957).
41 307 P.2d 479 (Colo. 1957).
42 3 H. & C. 774, 159 Eng. Rep. 7.7, rev'd L.R. 1 Ex. 265, aff'd, L.R. 3 H.L. 330.
43 Canon City and Cripple Creek R.R. v.
Oxtoby, 45 Colo. 214, 100 Pac. 1127
.(1908), Garnett Ditch and Reservoir Co. v. Sampson, 48 Colo. 285, 110 Pac. 79 (1910)
and Sylvester v. Jerome, 19 Cclo. 128, 24 Pac. 760 (183).
44 313 P,2d 712

(Colo. 1957).
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box. There was a lid over the box which was slightly awry, but the lid
and ground were covered with snow. She knew where the pit was, but
did not know the lid would tip when stepped on. The supreme court
affirmed the judgment in her favor and against the city. The court held
that the plaintiff was not negligent because she did not know that the
lid would tip, but more important, the court felt that even if she had
known the lid would tip, the question of her negligence would have
been for the jury. The court also stated that the reasonableness of plaintiff's choice of paths is a jury question. It should also be noted that the
city was considered to have had actual notice of the defect since the city
had constructed the pit and lid.
In Brighton v. DeGregorio5 the court attempted to straighten out
some of the confusion which arises in the attempted applications of the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The case involved a broken float pin on a
toilet. In upholding the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint, the supreme court held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is
not applicable in a situation in which two equal and opposite inferences
may be drawn. In other words, an inference of negligence on the one
hand, or an inference of reasonable conduct on the other. To apply
the doctrine to the instant case, the court felt was incorrect because one
could infer either that the defendant should have prevented the pin
from breaking or that the defendant could not have reasonably foreseen
such an occurrence.
4.

314 P.2d 276 (Colo. 1957).
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ONE YEAR REVIEW OF WILLS, ESTATES AND TRUSTS
By WILLIAM P. CANTVELI.
Member of the Denver firm Holland and Hart,
and Instructor in the University of Denver College of Law
The case law developments of the last year' in the field of wills,
estates and trusts have been typical of the gradual, paced growth of
2
decisions in these fields. The leading decision arose under such unusual
offers highly restricted
but
law,
facts that it probably establishes good
utility to any but the successful litigants in the case. The remaining
,decisions were few and relied on principles announced in earlier years.
For practitioners in the field, however, the year (lid see the addition of an excellent tool to their practice in the form of the Rocky Moun2
tain Law Review's Symposium Issue on Wills and Estates, collecting
articles on a variety of subjects in the field from ten practitioners or
educators from throughout the state.
Quintrall v. Goldsmith4 involved a will contest between a caveatrix
who had been adopted by two successive sets of parents and the takers
untder the will of the survivor of the first set of parents. The will had
left nothing to the caveatrix, notwithstanding an understanding made
part of the first adoption decree that the first adopting parents would
not "disinherit" caveatrix. The supreme court found that this was a
valid condition of the original decree of adoption, on the peculiar facts
of this case, although such conditions are now void by statute.' The
court expressly refrained from determining whether such statutory provision was retroactive. The result turned on the caveatrix' second adoption, the court holding that this divested the first adoptive parents, one
of whom was the decedent, of all rights and obligations under the first
decree, including the undertaking regarding inheritance by the caveatrix.
Aligning itself with the minority but "better reasoned" cases the
supreme court followed the lead of Michigan, Oklahoma, and, most
recently, Illinois,6 in holding, as a matter of law, that in the absence of a
valid undertaking or a statutory provision, a twice adopted child cannot
inherit from its first adoptive parents unless such parents have died prior
to the second adoption, or unless re-adopted by its own parents.
A classic pass-book-delivery case occupied the court in Coxwell v.
Forster,7 which resulted in a restatement of some of the cardinal principles of inter-vivos gifts. The decedent had delivered a savings and
loan pass-book to a third party under circumstances which amounted
to a gift to the plaintiff, according to her allegations. \Vhile the evidence showed some intent to make a gift, there was an absence of any
definitive actual or constructive delivery. The third party held the
pass-book for some time after the original intent was manifest, and
throughout this period deceased was fully able to complete delivery of
the money but did not. Since the court found that the money and not
the pass-book was the intended res, the gift failed because the money was
never unqualifiedly delivered.
Examination of the presumptions raised by a fiduciary relationship
1 This article covers cases decided by the Colorado Supreme Court from January
1 to Deee mber 31. 1957.
2 Quintrall v. Goldsmith, 134 Colo. 410, 306 P.2d 246 (Colo. 1957).
3 29 Rocky Mt. L. Rev. No. 4 (1957).
4 See note 2 supra.
2 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 152-2-4 (1953).
6 In re Leichtenberg's Estate. 7 Ill. 2d 545. 131 N.E. 2d 487 (1956).
7 314 P.2d 302 (Colo. 1957).
S 134 Colo. 573, 307 P.2d 1106 (Colo. 1957).
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occurred in Arnold v. Abernathy.8 The claimant against the decedent's
estate under a series of promissary notes and for certain other items was
successful below. On appeal the fiduciary relationship between the
claimant and the decedent was carefully scrutinized by the supreme
court, resulting in a reversal and remand with instructions to dismiss
the claims. The fiduciary relationship arose as a result of a course of
conduct between the claimant and the decedent in which the claimant
was "taking care of her affairs," acting as attorney in fact for her, and
otherwise unquestionably acting with the decedent's full confidence.
Under such circumstances, the court found that a presumption was
raised that the notes were obtained by undue influence or fraud, which
was never overcome by the claimant throughout the voluminous record.
Since the claimant and the estate each had contended that the other had
the burden of proof, the court followed its prevailing practice of
remanding with instructions to dismiss after finding a complete absence
the presumption.
of proof to carry the claimant's burden of overcoming
9
In Forster v. Franklin Life Insurance Co. a suit arose between an

executrix and an insurance company and certain named beneficiaries.
On behalf of the estate the executrix claimed portions of the proceeds
of the policies payable to creditors and others having no relationship
to the insured. The assertion was denied since it appeared that the
decedent-insured had acted voluntarily and was in no way restricted
from choosing the beneficiaries of his policies, regardless of the lack of
relationship of a beneficiary to him or that beneficiary's status as a
creditor. The assertion that a creditor can be a beneficiary only to the
extent of her claim was rejected, in the absence of any language to this
effect in the beneficiary endorsement itself.
6 ti P.2d 700 (Colo. 1957).
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